

policy recommendations

2025

young voters

voter analysis report

ranked choice voting

new voters

**NYC
VOTES**

New York City Campaign Finance Board

The Campaign Finance Board (CFB) is a nonpartisan, independent city agency that empowers New Yorkers to make a greater impact on their elections. We are dedicated to making our local democracy more open, transparent, and equitable.

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Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Overview

Each year, the New York City Campaign Finance Board (CFB) publishes a Voter Analysis Report examining how New Yorkers registered, engaged with, and participated in the previous year's elections. This report covers 2025—a year that defied expectations for a municipal election cycle. Voters turned out at the highest level in a city election in more than 50 years. More than twice as many people registered to vote compared to 2021. Young voters turned out at record-breaking rates. And a grassroots candidate, powered by small-dollar donations and the city's matching funds program, won the mayoral race despite more than \$54 million against him in outside spending from corporations and wealthy individuals.

Context

2025 began with special elections in Brooklyn and Staten Island, and built to a mayoral race that drew national attention. Assembly Member Zohran Mamdani, polling at 1% at the start of the year, ran a mayoral campaign focused on affordability, mobilizing young voters and first-time participants through social media. He won the Democratic primary with 56.4% of the final vote share after eleven rounds of ranked choice voting tabulations, supported by cross-endorsements from fellow progressive candidates.

In the general election, Mamdani defeated Andrew Cuomo, among others, winning 50.8% of the vote. He became the city's first Muslim and first South Asian mayor, and the youngest mayor elected in more than a century. His campaign was fueled by small donations, illustrating how the CFB's matching funds program can make it so New Yorkers don't need to be independently wealthy to run for office and get elected.

In addition to the mayor, voters cast ballots for comptroller, public advocate, borough presidents, city council members, and others. Further down the ballot, five of six ballot proposals passed, including three on affordable housing. A proposal from the CFB's 2024 Voter Analysis Report to align local elections with federal elections was narrowly rejected.

By the numbers

Voter engagement

The CFB reaches voters through its NYC Votes initiative, including the Voter Guide, community partnerships, multilingual materials, paid advertisements, youth programs, and the debates program. In 2025, New Yorkers' engagement with NYC Votes' digital content surged: Website visits more than doubled to 2.4 million, social media impressions grew nearly fivefold to 72.3 million, and email subscribers rose from 75,000 to 117,000, compared to 2024. Throughout 2025, the CFB distributed nearly 20 million pieces of printed material (including 8.3 million Voter Guides to registered voters), ran 325 outreach events, worked with 116 community partners, and reached an estimated 200 million views through advertisements. The official debates program drew more than double the number of viewers compared to 2021, helping propel the mayoral election to a national audience.

Voter registration

More than 5.3 million New Yorkers were registered to vote in 2025. This represents a registration rate of 94.3%, up nearly 9 percentage points from 2024 and the first time it has surpassed 90% since 2021. New registrations more than doubled compared to 2021, with more than 260,000 people registering for the first time, approaching the number of new voters typically seen in a presidential election year.¹ Registrations spiked sharply before eligibility deadlines: 16,505 people registered on the day before the primary cutoff, more than five times the 2021 single-day record. Young voters (under 30) drove nearly two-thirds of new registrations, though their overall registration rate (84.4%) still lagged behind voters over 30 (96.9%) by more than 12 percentage points.

Voter turnout

Primary turnout rose to 29.9%, up from 26.5% in 2021. General election turnout reached 41.6% (2.2 million voters), the highest in a New York City election in over 50 years and nearly double the 23.3% recorded in 2021. Every borough saw double-digit turnout gains in the general election, with Manhattan leading overall turnout at 48.5% and the Bronx recording the lowest at 30.3%. The biggest story was youth engagement, with voters aged 18–29 turning out at 41.9% in the general election, more than triple their 11.1% rate in 2021, reducing the average voter age from 55 to 50.

¹ In this report, “new voters” refers to those who are newly registered in New York City. This includes voters who are registering for the first time, but also voters who may have existed on voter rolls but have updated registration, for example, those who have recently moved to New York City.

Figure 1: Voter turnout by age group, general elections, 2021 and 2025

| Age group | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
|-----------|-------|-------|-----------------------------|
| 18–29 | 11.1% | 41.9% | 30.8 |
| 30–39 | 16.3% | 37.2% | 20.9 |
| 40–49 | 22.1% | 39.2% | 17.1 |
| 50–59 | 28.7% | 44.7% | 16.0 |
| 60–69 | 35.4% | 47.9% | 12.5 |
| 70–79 | 37.9% | 48.7% | 10.8 |
| 80+ | 23.2% | 30.2% | 7.0 |

Voting method

New Yorkers have the option to vote in person on election day, in person during early voting, by mail, and by other methods for special circumstances, such as military ballot. During the 2025 general election, voting in person remained the most popular voting method by far, with 58.0% of New Yorkers voting in person on election day and 33.1% voting in person during early voting.

On the ballot


The 2025 general election ballot included races for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, all five borough presidents, and all 51 city council seats, plus six ballot proposals. The one statewide proposal and five of the six citywide proposals passed, including three measures to streamline affordable housing review and one to create a digital city map (which received the highest support at 73.6%). The one rejected proposal would have moved city elections to align with presidential election years. Notably, drop-off rates (the share of voters who skip a race or proposal on their ballots) followed an unusual pattern in 2025: Ballot Proposals 2 and 3 received more votes than Proposal 1, reversing the typical trend of declining engagement as the ballot progresses.

In focus

New voters

New registrations in 2025 more than doubled compared to 2021, reaching 260,195, a number much closer to what's typically seen in presidential election years.

Figure 2: Number of newly registered voters by year, 2017 to 2025



Newly registered voters turned out at high rates: 59.6% in the primary and 61.8% in the general (triple the 2021 figure), reversing the historical pattern of low participation among new registrants. Nearly two-thirds of new registrants were under 30, and among new voters, younger age groups turned out at the highest rates.

Ranked choice voting

2025 marked the third time New York City used ranked choice voting (RCV) in primary elections. 79.0% of voters ranked more than one candidate in at least one race, down from 88.3% in 2021. In the Democratic mayoral race, the most common ballot sequence—Cuomo in the first rank followed by four blanks—appeared on 15.3% of valid ballots. The ranking sequence Mamdani–Lander–Adrienne Adams–Myrie–Blake appeared on 74,185 ballots, or 14.2% of all ballots that used all five ranks. This was a stark increase compared to 2021, when the most common sequence that used all five ranks was used on just 0.1% of ballots, demonstrating how voters and organizations are using RCV more strategically. Ballot errors continued to decline: fatal overvote rates, or the rate of errors that invalidate ballots, decreased from 1.2% in 2021 to 0.9% in 2025.

Recommendations

Update on previous recommendations

Each year, the CFB makes recommendations in the Voter Analysis Report to improve voter engagement and participation. Two key recommendations progressed in the past year, while the recommendation to align city and federal election was rejected on the ballot in 2025.

- **Implemented:** Civic Engagement Fellowship (recommended 2023)
 - » Launched August 2025 in partnership with CUNY. The two-year pilot, which runs through August 2027, matched 14 CUNY students with 14 Bronx-based community organizations.
- **Enacted:** Join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) (recommended 2024)
 - » Governor Hochul signed legislation in December 2025 requiring New York to join ERIC by July 31, 2026, modernizing voter roll management across the state's 62 county boards.
- **Not passed:** Align city elections with presidential years (recommended 2024)
 - » Placed on the November 2025 ballot but rejected by 52.8% of voters. Voters could return to this topic via a future Charter Revision Commission, City Council legislation, or State action.

Recommendation to align registration dates

New York is one of ten states with closed primaries, meaning voters must be registered with a political party to vote in that party's primary. New York's party enrollment deadline is February 14, more than four months before the June primary, requiring voters to make enrollment decisions long before candidates or party primaries are even confirmed. These two policies taken together create one of the most restrictive primary systems in the country, a system that many voters experienced for the first time in 2025.

To allow more voters to participate in primary elections, the state legislature should amend the election law to move the party enrollment deadline to ten days before an election, to line up with the voter registration deadline.

While doing this, the state legislature should also amend the election law to move the change of name and/or address deadline to this same day.

This would address the asymmetry in how New York election law treats those who seek to register versus those who seek to make changes to their registration. Under this change, already-registered voters would have the same window to choose their party enrollment and correctly record their name and/or address ahead of the mayoral primary as first-time registrants.

Recommendations to strengthen CFB governance

The Voter Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC), a nine-member body that advises the CFB on voter engagement, has long been non-functional: it has had no chair since May 2023 and no appointed members since December 2024. The CFB has largely absorbed its work. The CFB recommends consolidating the VAAC into a reformed Board structure through three changes:

1. Integrate the VAAC's responsibilities directly into the Board, formalizing voter engagement as a core Board mandate and requiring two public hearings per year.
2. Expand the Board from five to seven members, with the mayor and speaker each appointing three members (up from two), and the mayor continuing to appoint the chair after consultation with the speaker.
3. Align Board member compensation with comparable City boards; current pay is \$100 per day, which may limit who can serve.

Strengthening the CFB's governance aligns with broader democracy and good government priorities: increasing public trust, centering voter experience, and ensuring that oversight bodies reflect the communities they serve.

Conclusion

The 2025 election cycle showed that New York City’s local democracy is healthy and capable of engaging voters at levels more commonly associated with federal elections. The CFB’s matching funds program worked as intended, amplifying grassroots support against outside spending. Voter turnout and registration hit historic highs. Young voters participated at rates never seen before in a city election.

Despite this, gaps remain. CFB priority community districts in the South Bronx, East Brooklyn, and parts of Queens still lag well behind citywide averages in voter registration and turnout. Young voters, despite their surge in participation, remain registered at lower rates than older New Yorkers. The CFB’s work—outreach, language access, youth programming, and the recommendations in this report—is aimed squarely at closing those gaps.

Fast Facts

Fast Facts

Voter registration

| Borough | Number of registered voters | Registration rate (% of eligible voting population) |
|---------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Bronx | 789,801 | 92.1% |
| Brooklyn | 1,675,259 | 97.3% |
| Manhattan | 1,160,918 | 93.4% |
| Queens | 1,355,109 | 92.8% |
| Staten Island | 337,207 | 94.7% |
| Citywide | 5,639,135 | 94.3% |

Voter turnout

| Borough | Primary Election | | General Election | |
|---------------|------------------|---------|------------------|---------|
| | Voters | Turnout | Voters | Turnout |
| Bronx | 117,331 | 20.6% | 239,441 | 30.3% |
| Brooklyn | 394,800 | 33.2% | 715,333 | 42.7% |
| Manhattan | 322,792 | 40.5% | 562,690 | 48.5% |
| Queens | 236,074 | 25.7% | 543,856 | 40.1% |
| Staten Island | 36,206 | 16.2% | 153,768 | 45.6% |
| Citywide | 1,107,203 | 29.9% | 2,215,088 | 41.6% |

Voting method

| Method | Primary Election | General Election |
|---|------------------|------------------|
| Election day | 56.9% | 58.0% |
| In-person early | 34.5% | 33.1% |
| Vote by mail | 7.0% | 7.1% |
| Other (includes military and affidavit ballots) | 1.7% | 1.9% |

On the ballot

| Ballot Measure | % Voting Yes (NYC) |
|---|--------------------|
| Proposal 1: Olympic complex | 45.5%* |
| Proposal 2: Fast track affordable housing | 58.5% |
| Proposal 3: Simplify review of modest housing | 56.9% |
| Proposal 4: Affordable Housing Appeals Board | 58.5% |
| Proposal 5: Digital city map | 73.6% |
| Proposal 6: Align local and federal elections | 47.2% |

* In New York City, 45.5% of voters supported Ballot Proposal 1, compared with 58.0% of voters in the rest of New York State. Despite an approximately 12 percentage point gap between New York City and the rest of the State, the proposal passed with 51.9% support across all of New York State.

Introduction

Introduction

Key points

- ▶ The CFB publishes an annual Voter Analysis Report examining voter registration, engagement, and participation in New York City elections.
- ▶ This Voter Analysis Report covers the 2025 election cycle, outlining the key stories, trends, and recommendations to align voter registration dates and improve CFB governance.

The 2025 election cycle demonstrated that New York City’s local democracy is vibrant and healthy. The CFB’s matching funds program worked as intended, boosting grassroots support against record outside spending, voter registration and turnout hit historic highs, and young voters participated at record levels.

This 2025 Voter Analysis Report provides an overview of these stories and the data behind them, and explores the issues important to ensuring New York’s democracy continues to thrive.

Purpose and background

The New York City Campaign Finance Board (CFB) is a nonpartisan, independent city agency that empowers New Yorkers to participate more meaningfully in their elections. The CFB works to reduce the influence of big private money in politics by amplifying the power of small-dollar contributions through the city’s nationally recognized matching funds program. It also works to eliminate barriers to participation by giving New Yorkers the information and resources they need to vote or run for office.

The CFB has a mandate to prepare and publish reports, including the annual Voter Analysis Report, which reports on voter registration and participation in New York City.

This year's Voter Analysis Report includes an overview of the CFB's voter engagement activities in 2025, presents key trends and data from the 2025 elections, and explores ways to make elections in New York City more inclusive, accessible, and representative.

Throughout the report, findings or data are compared to 2024—the previous election year, and 2021—the most recent citywide election year.

Report structure

This report is structured into four main sections:

1. **Context:** Provides an overview of the key stories of the year.
2. **By the numbers:** Explores key voting stats and figures in 2025.
3. **In focus:** Provides a deeper analysis on themes that have been particularly relevant this past election year, namely new voters and ranked choice voting.
4. **Recommendations:** Provides an update on previous Voter Analysis Report recommendations, and outlines new recommendations to align voter registration dates and strengthen CFB governance.

Overall, 2025 was a year of broken records and conventional wisdom upended. This year's report examines the data behind that story, exploring who registered, who voted, and what it means for democracy in New York City.

Context

Context

Key points

- ▶ Both the primary and general elections in 2025 featured competitive candidate fields, a record-breaking influx of independent spending, and historic turnout levels for a municipal election.
- ▶ In the mayoral race, incumbent Mayor Eric Adams opted out of the Democratic primary and eventually dropped his reelection bid altogether; former governor Andrew Cuomo attempted a political comeback but lost both the primary and general elections; and Assembly Member Zohran Mamdani rose from 1% in early polls to an upset Democratic primary victory and garnered over one million votes to win the general election.
- ▶ All major mayoral candidates participated in the city's matching funds program, which matches small dollar donations from New Yorkers at an \$8-to-\$1 match. This enabled strong grassroots support to counter more than \$80 million of independent spending from corporations and wealthy individuals.

On paper, 2025 was not supposed to be a dynamic city election; the sitting mayor planned to seek reelection, and while all 51 city council seats were up for grabs, municipal elections traditionally garner less voter enthusiasm in New York City compared to federal elections. In reality, the citywide elections upended conventional wisdom at every turn, and made for a showcase of NYC's election rules and reforms—from the CFB's nationally recognized matching funds program to the second citywide election using ranked choice voting.

The year saw a spate of special elections, a competitive Democratic primary that drove voter turnout, and a general election in which major corporations, out-of-state billionaires, and even the sitting president attempted to sway the outcome.

While New York City typically sees less competitive general elections compared to its primaries, the contest between Assembly Member Zohran Mamdani and former governor Andrew Cuomo ensured competition, and voter engagement, remained strong throughout the entire 2025 election cycle.

The result was a historic victory by 33-year-old Mamdani, who won the mayoral race with over 52,000 small-dollar donations, despite more than \$50 million in corporate and private spending to try to defeat him.

Special elections

2025 kicked off with a cascade of special elections as local leaders retired or moved between the city and state legislatures. City special elections are nonpartisan and use ranked choice voting to determine a winner.

First came the March 25 special election to replace Kalman Yeger, a Democrat who served as the City Council Member for Council District 44, representing heavily Orthodox Jewish sections of Central and South Brooklyn, after Yeger was elected to the New York State Assembly. In a matchup against Heshy Tishler for the newly vacant council seat, State Senator Simcha Felder received the overwhelming majority of votes from the neighborhoods of Borough Park and Midwood. Felder's election to the city council triggered yet another special election in May for his newly vacated State Senate seat representing Brooklyn's District 22, which encompasses Borough Park, Midwood, and parts of Flatbush.

One month after the Council District 44 special election, Republican Council Member Joe Borelli announced his retirement from the city council, triggering a special election for Staten Island Council District 51 on April 29. Republican radio host Frank Morano won the three-way race outright with a strong vote share in the first round of the ranked choice tabulation. Morano served out the remainder of Borelli's term and went on to win his primary election in June 2025 as well as the general election matchup in November 2025 for another full term.

Primary elections

While the headline of the 2025 primary elections in New York City was the crowded Democratic mayoral field, capped off with a surprise victory from relative newcomer Mamdani, this cycle included an open contest for comptroller, a challenge to the incumbent public advocate, one open race for Manhattan borough president, and all 51 city council seats up for grabs (30 of which had primary challenges).

At the start of the year, Mayor Eric Adams was running for reelection as a Democrat, facing challenges from Comptroller Brad Lander, former Comptroller and previous mayoral candidate Scott Stringer, State Senator Zellnor Myrie, State Senator Jessica Ramos, hedge fund manager Whitney Tilson, and State Assembly Member Zohran Mamdani, among others. In March, former Governor Andrew Cuomo entered the race, hoping to make a political comeback. The same month, City Council Speaker Adrienne Adams announced her candidacy with the backing of New York Attorney General Letitia James.

Context

With Mayor Adams' favorability plummeting after he was federally indicted on charges of corruption, the political and media class predicted Cuomo would cruise to victory.² Eventually, the mayor dropped out of the Democratic primary, announcing he would run in the general election as an Independent. Mamdani, who hardly registered in polls at the beginning of the year, ran a campaign focused on affordability, with platform planks including universal free childcare and free city bus services. The Mamdani campaign was fueled by a grassroots movement of volunteers, omnipresence both on- and offline, and a turnout strategy that targeted young voters, South Asian and Muslim communities, and Trump voters, looking beyond traditionally reliable Democratic primary voters. The surge in interest in the Democratic primary saw more voters engaging with the closed primary system for the first time, with many of them caught unaware of the rules on who can vote.

In a New York City ranked choice voting (RCV) first, Mamdani secured cross-endorsements from Lander, a fellow Working Families Party-endorsed candidate who shared many of the same progressive positions, and Assembly Member Michael Blake. Cuomo received an endorsement from Ramos, but he did not return the endorsement.

At the end of a spirited get-out-the-vote season, which saw two lively official CFB-sponsored debates, the arrest of Lander by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents for escorting a migrant through immigration proceedings, and a record-breaking \$46.1 million in independent expenditures, Mamdani won the Democratic nomination for mayor with a decisive 56.4% of the vote.³ Further information about the Democratic mayoral primary and the impact of ranked choice voting can be found in the [In focus: Ranked choice voting](#) section of this report.

Beyond the mayoral race, Manhattan Borough President Mark Levine defeated Council Member Justin Brannan in the Democratic primary for comptroller; Public Advocate Jumaane Williams fended off a challenge from Assembly Member Jenifer Rajkumar; State Senator Brad Hoylman-Sigal became the Democratic nominee for Manhattan Borough President; and Bronx Borough President Vanessa Gibson fended off a challenge from Council Member Rafael Salamanca. In the city council, Democrat Shahana Hanif (District 39) defeated challenger Maya Kornberg in a race which included an influx of outside spending; Democrat

2 Quinnipiac University. "[Mayor Adams' Job Approval Rating Drops To All-Time Low Of 20%, Quinnipiac University New York City Poll Finds; 56% Of Voters Say Adams Should Resign From Office.](#)" 5 Mar 2025.; Emerson College Polling. "[New York City Mayoral Poll: Cuomo Leads Primary, Adams Faces Low Support Amid High Unfavorability.](#)" 7 Feb 2025.; Lewis, Rebecca C. "Andrew Cuomo Was Inevitable – Until He Wasn't." *City & State*. 24 Nov 2025.

3 Ferré-Sadurní, Luis. "[Brad Lander is Arrested by ICE Agents at Immigration Courthouse.](#)" *The New York Times*. 17 Jun 2025.

Alexa Avilés (District 38) defended her seat against challenger Ling Ye; and Republican Inna Vernikov (District 48) defeated challenger and former council member Ari Kagan.

General election

After a heated mayoral primary election, voters faced an unusually crowded and competitive general election field. In addition to Democratic nominee Mamdani and Republican candidate Curtis Sliwa, Mayor Eric Adams resumed campaigning as an Independent. Cuomo opted to do the same, and attorney Jim Walden rounded out the major Independent candidates. With Mamdani's broad support and the share of moderate-to-conservative votes split between Cuomo, Adams, and Sliwa, Sliwa faced strong pressure to withdraw from the race, including from President Donald Trump.

While Sliwa did not succumb to pressure to drop out, Mayor Adams withdrew from the race in late September, blaming his campaign's lack of viability on media speculation and his inability to establish eligibility for public matching funds. Independent Jim Walden also dropped his bid, leaving a three-way race (although both Adams and Walden remained on the ballot, confusing some voters). Cuomo received endorsements from recent rivals Mayor Adams and Walden, former Mayor Michael Bloomberg (who also donated \$13.3 million to pro-Cuomo independent spenders), and President Trump.⁴

Democratic nominee Mamdani won the mayoral election, becoming New York City's first Muslim and first South Asian mayor.⁵ Mamdani also became the youngest mayor to be elected in New York City in over a century. Mamdani won 50.8% of the vote with more than 1.1 million votes, while Cuomo and Sliwa netted 41.6% and 7.1% each of the vote total.

Down the ballot, Mark Levine and Jumaane Williams won their races for Comptroller and Public Advocate, respectively. In the city council, incumbent Kristy Marmorato (District 13), the first Republican to represent the Bronx in over 40 years, was defeated by union leader Shirley Aldebol, a Democrat; Democrat Phil Wong (District 30) defeated Republican Alicia Vaichunas in a toss-up race to replace Democrat Bob Holden, for whom both candidates were former staffers; and Democrat Kayla Santosuosso won the race to succeed her former boss, Justin Brannan, in District 47.

4 Smith, Greg B. "[Cuomo Backers Burned \\$65 Per Vote, Including \\$13.5 Million from Bloomberg.](#)" *THE CITY*. 6 Nov 2025.; Rubinstein, Dana, and Michael Gold. "[Trump Endorses Cuomo for NYC Mayor on Eve of Election.](#)" *The New York Times*. 3 Nov 2025.

5 Smith, Greg B. "[Cuomo Backers Burned \\$65 Per Vote, Including \\$13.5 Million from Bloomberg.](#)" *THE CITY*. 6 Nov 2025.

Ballot proposals

Voters in the 2025 general election had the opportunity to weigh in on six ballot proposals to change New York’s State Constitution and City Charter.

A state ballot proposal concerning the Olympic Sports Complex in the Adirondacks, which brings the state into compliance with laws governing protected forest lands, was approved by voters across the state despite it not receiving majority support in New York City.

The other five proposals arose from a Charter Revision Commission called by Mayor Eric Adams. The first three proposed changes to the way housing developments and other land-use changes are reviewed and approved. These were championed by housing advocates and opposed by the city council, whose role in some decision-making was diminished under the new processes. Voters approved these proposals. A proposal to digitize the city’s maps also passed.

The only proposal rejected by voters was the last one, which would have brought the city one step closer to shifting local elections to fall on the same year as federal elections.

More details on the 2025 ballot proposals can be found in the [On the ballot](#) section of this report. Background on the proposal to align local elections with federal elections can be found in the [Update on previous recommendations](#) section of this report.

Campaigning and fundraising

In a year that upended conventional wisdom across the board, fundraising was no exception. The winning mayoral candidate made innovative use of online platforms to generate momentum and solicit contributions—so successfully that he received the maximum amount of public funds in both the primary and general elections. In May, after maxing out matchable contributions, Mamdani urged his supporters to contribute instead to the campaign of Council Speaker Adrienne Adams, a co-Working Families Party-endorsed candidate, ahead of a critical deadline for her to qualify for public matching funds.⁶ Adrienne Adams pulled in \$117,000 in donations in the following days. In September, after reaching the matching funds program expenditure limit, Mamdani released a video telling supporters to stop sending money and start volunteering, attempting to convert his grassroots champions into field support.⁷

6 Novikoff, Devyn. “[How Much Did Zohran Mamdani’s Call to Action Help Adrienne Adams’ Fundraising?](#)” *City & State*. 29 May 2025.

7 @ZohranKMamdani. “[I am once again asking you to stop sending us money. But we do need your time.](#)” X. 5 Sep 2025.

These campaign tactics engaged with the RCV primary dynamic, the limits and thresholds baked into the matching funds program, and the underlying theory that small-dollar donors can make a big difference with the help of public financing, since small contributions are matched at a rate of \$8-to-\$1. These efforts served as countervailing forces amid a historic influx of big money.

Special interest groups and independent expenditures

2025 was a record-breaking year for independent expenditures by billionaires and special interest groups—though election outcomes did not align with the amount of money spent.

Citizens Union chronicled how independent spenders poured \$46.1 million into the primary election alone, 89% of which was spent either supporting Cuomo or opposing Mamdani.⁸ The largest of these independent expenditure committees was Fix the City, which raised over \$32 million. Major corporate contributors included Airbnb, Uber, DoorDash, and real estate companies; ultra-wealthy individual contributors included Bill Ackman, Ronald Lauder, William Lauder, Barry Diller, Dan Loeb, Steve Wynn, and Alice Walton.⁹ Fix the City spent \$18 million in support of Cuomo and \$11 million against Mamdani, including a \$12.7 million push in the two weeks preceding the general election.¹⁰ The videos, texts, robocalls, and advertisements originating from independent spenders spawned widespread criticism for Islamophobia.¹¹ In an unrelated action in May 2025, the CFB withheld more than \$600,000 in public matching funds from Cuomo, determining there was reason to believe the Cuomo campaign received an impermissible contribution from Fix the City in the form of a coordinated expenditure.¹²

The winning mayoral candidate Mamdani, by comparison, saw \$6.5 million in independent spending in support of his campaign or in opposition to Cuomo, coming from backers including the Working Families Party. *THE CITY* calculated Mamdani's cost-per-vote was \$15.81, compared to Cuomo's \$65 per vote.¹³

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- 8 Citizens Union. "[How Big Money Lost and Small Donors Won in the 2025 NYC Primary.](#)" Jul 2025.
 - 9 Frank, Robert. "[Billionaires are Spending Big to Stop Zohran Mamdani's NYC Mayoral Bid.](#)" *CNBC*. 30 Oct 2025.
 - 10 Smith, Greg B. "[Cuomo Backers Burned \\$65 Per Vote, Including \\$13.5 Million from Bloomberg.](#)" *THE CITY*. 6 Nov 2025.
 - 11 Fitzsimmons, Emma, and Dana Rubinstein. "[Mamdani's Face was Altered in a Rejected Campaign Flier for Cuomo.](#)" *The New York Times*. 12 Jun 2025.; Kamisar, Ben. "[Pro-Andrew Cuomo Super PAC Depicts Zohran Mamdani in Front of Twin Towers Attack in Late Ad.](#)" *NBC News*. 3 Nov 2025.
 - 12 New York City Campaign Finance Board. "[NYC Campaign Finance Board Approves Pre-Primary Matching Funds Payments to 2025 Candidates.](#)" 12 May 2025.
 - 13 Smith, Greg B. "[Cuomo Backers Burned \\$65 Per Vote, Including \\$13.5 Million from Bloomberg.](#)" *THE CITY*. 6 Nov 2025.

Beyond the mayoral race, independent spenders poured money into several losing campaigns, including Keith Powers' bid for Manhattan borough president, Yanna Henriquez's third-place finish for City Council District 21 in Northwest Queens, and attempts to unseat incumbent Council Members Chris Marte, Alexa Avilés, and Shahana Hanif. The level of independent spending in down-ballot primary races sharply increased in 2025; independent expenditures totaled \$14.6 million in city council races, compared to \$6.1 million in 2013, \$0.9 million in 2017, and \$4.9 million in 2021.¹⁴

Matching funds program

The 2025 New York City elections — particularly the dynamic mayoral race — served as proof of a strong campaign finance system's potential to shake up political assumptions. More than \$81 million in outside spending did not determine the outcome of the race.¹⁵


The top three vote-getters in the mayoral general election all opted into the matching funds program. In theory, this incentivized their campaigns to prioritize small-dollar donors, which translates to making a broad appeal to voters rather than courting insiders and special interests. Mamdani's campaign embraced this tactic, netting 52,560 small contributions (\$250 and below), yielding \$4 million in private donations, and receiving roughly \$13.1 million in matching funds. In comparison, the other top candidate, Cuomo, received 7,772 small contributions, \$6 million in private donations, and roughly \$8 million in matching funds; Cuomo was also the beneficiary of tens of millions of dollars from outside spenders. Curtis Sliwa raised \$1.5 million in private contributions and qualified for \$5.3 million in matching funds, while Mayor Eric Adams raised \$6.7 million in private money but did not qualify for matching funds.¹⁶ The level of private donations and matching funds received by the three leading candidates and the incumbent are shown in Figure 1.1.

14 Citizens Union. "[How Big Money Lost and Small Donors Won in the 2025 NYC Primary.](#)" Jul 2025.

15 Smith, Greg B. "[Cuomo Backers Burned \\$65 Per Vote, Including \\$13.5 Million from Bloomberg.](#)" *THE CITY*. 6 Nov 2025.

16 The Board repeatedly determined Mayor Adams' campaign failed to demonstrate eligibility for public funds payment on two grounds: one, failure to provide requested information, and two, reason to believe the candidate violated the law.

Figure 1.1: Private donations and matching funds received in 2025



As can be seen, while Eric Adams and Cuomo raised more in private donations, the match on small-dollar contributions meant that Mamdani raised more in overall funds. Curtis Sliwa had the highest rate of matching funds relative to the amount he raised in private donations.

Context

As the CFB’s founding Executive Director Nicole Gordon stated, the matching funds program was “a crucial factor that made [Mamdani’s] unlikely bid for mayor possible in the first place ... In what other system would a candidate be able to tell supporters not to donate any more money to his campaign?”¹⁷

Divorced from any specific outcome, the 2025 election cycle represented a major success for the matching funds program by holding candidates accountable to the law, amplifying the power of everyday New Yorkers who wanted to support their candidate of choice, and enabling qualified candidates to run viable campaigns even in the face of massive independent expenditures.

A full analysis of the matching funds program will be included in the CFB’s Post-Election Report, to be released in September 2026.

Conclusion

The elections of 2025 weren’t just matchups of candidates across ideological and demographic lines — although there were plenty of those. This cycle represented a showdown between big money (independent spenders funded by corporations, billionaires, and industry lobbies) and grassroots momentum. It benefited from the city’s \$8-to-\$1 match, RCV strategy, and the premise that small-dollar donors can become volunteers, who can in turn become more deeply and consistently engaged in the political process. At a time when democratic principles are being contested at the federal level, local democracy in New York City proved to be healthy, vibrant, and ever-evolving.

17 Gordon, Nicole. [“NYC’s Matching Funds Fueled Mamdani’s Success.”](#) *New York Daily News*. 22 Nov 2025.

By the Numbers

By the numbers: Voter engagement

Key points

- ▶ The CFB engages in voter education and outreach activities through its NYC Votes initiative. The CFB also engages with New York residents, voters, and campaigns through its matching funds program, debates program, and public hearings.
- ▶ NYC Votes' online and social media engagement surged in 2025, with social media impressions increasing five-fold compared to last year.
- ▶ The matching funds program had an impactful year, with 82.3% of registered candidates participating, \$87.0 million in matching funds distributed to 275 campaigns, and over 240,000 contributions made in the 2025 election cycle.

The CFB has a charter mandate to engage with New Yorkers to increase voter registration and participation. The agency fulfils this through a variety of methods. These include:

- Engaging directly with New Yorkers through the CFB's voter engagement initiative, NYC Votes.
- Distributing online and printed voting materials, including the Voter Guide.
- Messaging through paid and earned media.
- Engaging with priority communities, including translating materials and working with community partners.
- Programming specifically aimed at engaging young voters.
- Encouraging civic participation among city residents and candidates through the matching funds program.
- Holding official debates for the primary and general elections.
- Holding public hearings.

For many voters, seeing an NYC Votes advertisement, receiving the Voter Guide, or engaging with NYC Votes at a community event serves as the first touchpoint where they learn about an upcoming election.

This section provides an overview of priority populations for the CFB's voter engagement work, then follows up with key statistics for each of these voter engagement methods.

Who we engage

The CFB engages with all New Yorkers who may be eligible to vote, including 5.3 million registered voters. Additionally, the CFB has a specific focus on empowering New Yorkers who are less likely to vote, reducing barriers to running for office, and offering solutions to improve New York's election system. To this end, the CFB has identified priority communities and priority community districts, representing both demographic and geographic groups that are underrepresented in the electoral process.

CFB priority communities and community districts

Guided by its charter mandate, the CFB periodically analyzes quantitative and qualitative data to identify communities—both demographic and geographic—that are underrepresented in the electoral process in terms of voter engagement, registration, and participation. These communities include:

- Voters under the age of 30
- Immigrant voters
- Voters who primarily speak a language other than English
- Voters with disabilities
- Voters who have been directly impacted by the criminal legal system

In addition to priority communities, the CFB has identified priority community districts, areas with large concentrations of these groups of voters, based on additional U.S. Census and voter turnout data. Priority neighborhoods within these community districts include areas of the South Bronx, South Brooklyn, Northern Queens, and Central Queens. The CFB uses this designation to target voter outreach and education efforts. See Figure 2.1 for a map of the CFB's priority community districts.

Figure 2.1: CFB priority community districts



Voter engagement by the numbers

The rest of this section provides key statistics about each of the CFB's voter engagement efforts. Overall, the level of in-person voter engagement was comparable to previous years, while online and social media engagement surged in 2025.

Community outreach, engagement, and education

Through its voter engagement arm, NYC Votes, the CFB engages directly with voters through on-the-ground events, canvassing, phone and text banks, and voter registration drives. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the key numbers for voter engagement and outreach events.

Figure 2.2: Voter engagement and outreach

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Voter engagement and outreach events | 325 |
| New voters registered at events | 2,350 |
| Voting pledge cards filled out | 14,600 |
| NYC Votes conversations | 30,000 |

The CFB also engages with local community partners to educate people in civic engagement, voting, elections, and the matching funds program. Partnering with local organizations, particularly those who work directly with CFB's priority communities, allows the CFB to build trust, provide relevant resources, and deliver accessible education, meeting people where they live and work.

Figure 2.3: Community partners

| | |
|--|--------|
| Number of community partners | 116 |
| Community partner hours of education | 620 |
| Community partner volunteer shifts | 880 |
| Number of event participants | 10,000 |
| Number of education sessions focused on matching funds program | 72 |

Examples of the CFB’s work with community partners include providing civic and voter engagement workshops in collaboration with community-based organizations (CBOs), listening to and learning from the disability community to improve accessibility in our work, and increasing the CFB’s education presence in NYC public schools.

Additionally, this year, the CFB launched a first-ever workshop on the CFB’s matching funds program, educating community partners on the program and its impact in empowering New Yorkers.

Language access and equity

New York City is home to nearly one million citizens of voting age who speak limited English.¹⁸ In 2025, the CFB offered translation and interpretation during events and through written materials in 13 languages other than English. Through this expanded language access work, the CFB has made significant progress in trust-building efforts, such as with Arabic- and Urdu-speaking communities.

18 The City of New York, Civic Engagement Commission and Office of Data Analytics. [“NYC Community Language Profiles.”](#)

The CFB translated written materials to 13 languages: Arabic, Bengali, Chinese (simplified and traditional), French, Haitian Creole, Hindi, Korean, Polish, Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu. Additionally, the CFB provided spoken interpretation, American Sign Language (ASL) translation, and Communication Access Real-time Translation (CART).¹⁹

Figure 2.4: Working with CBOs to improve language access and equity

| | |
|--|-----|
| Translation requests | 220 |
| Spoken interpretation: Number of requests | 17 |
| Spoken interpretation: Number of languages | 4 |
| American Sign Language (ASL) requests | 43 |
| Communication Access Real-time Translation (CART) requests | 14 |

Youth programs

The CFB directly engages with young New Yorkers through the NYC Votes Youth Ambassador Program. The Youth Ambassador Program skills young New Yorkers, ages 14 to 19, with knowledge about the voting process, the history of democracy in New York City, how to get involved in local government and politics, and how to educate and engage young voters. Events include field trips, both virtual and in-person get out the vote events, and collaborating in research with CFB staff, 2025 marked the sixth cohort of the program. The local election led to high engagement in the program in 2025, including a large portion of the program dedicated to learning about the CFB’s matching funds program and its impacts.

¹⁹ Communication Access Real-time Translation (CART), or “live captioning,” is the instantaneous transcription of spoken English into visual print display. CART service is one means of communication access for D/deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals who read English fluently.

Figure 2.5: Youth programs

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| Youth Ambassador Program applications | 314 |
| Youth Ambassador Program participants | 16 |
| Youth Ambassador Program events | 48 |
| Youth Alumni Committee members | 11 |
| Alumni Committee member events | 9 |

This year, the CFB also launched the Alumni Committee, which worked to support and supplement the Youth Ambassador Program.

Online and print voting materials

The CFB develops and distributes printed materials via mail, community partners, and at on-the-ground events. In 2025, the CFB delivered almost 20 million pieces of printed materials. Of these, the Voter Guide is the most widely distributed, as it is required under the City Charter to be distributed to all registered voters. Figure 2.6 provides an overview of the number of printed materials that the CFB produced and distributed for the 2025 primary and general elections.

Figure 2.6: Printed materials

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Voter Guides | 8.3 million |
| Flyers: Large print | 89,250 |
| Flyers: Braille | 1,500 |
| Palm cards, door hangers, and booklets | 310,500 |
| Pledge cards | 15,000 |

The CFB complements its printed materials with online and digital outreach and engagement. This outreach was particularly important in 2025, as social media and other digital channels played a role in spurring increased voter participation. Figure 2.7 provides an overview of the number of digital engagements.

Figure 2.7: Online outreach and engagement

| | |
|--|--------------|
| NYC Votes website visits | 2.4 million |
| Social media engagements ²⁰ | 122,000 |
| Social media followers | 77,000 |
| Social media impressions ²¹ | 72.3 million |
| Email subscribers | 117,000 |
| Text reminders ahead of election day | 1.5 million |

2025 saw a surge in voters engaging with the CFB’s online presence, with the number of visits to the NYC Votes website more than doubling, and social media impressions increasing almost five-fold compared to 2024. The number of email subscribers also increased to 117,000, up from 75,000 in 2024.

Marketing and advertisements

The CFB seeks to increase voter awareness through a variety of paid advertisements. In 2025, this included advertisements in subway stations and trains, at local laundromats, and at baseball stadiums, among others.

20 “Social media engagements” measures active interactions such as “likes,” “shares,” and “comments.”

21 “Social media impressions” measures the number of times content is displayed on a user’s page.

Figure 2.8: Marketing and advertisements

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| Advertisements (total) ²² | 950 |
| Impressions from ad campaigns | 200.0 million |

New Yorkers viewed NYC Votes advertisements an estimated 200 million times.

Earned media

In addition to paid media, the CFB’s public relations team works with press and other media opportunities to disseminate crucial information about elections in New York City. In 2025, the CFB was mentioned in 277 news articles, including in *The New York Times*, *New York Daily News*, *El Diario*, *THE CITY*, *POLITICO*, *City & State*, *Gothamist*, and many more.

Additionally, members of the CFB participated in broadcast interviews with networks including NY1, Univision, CBS, and iHeart Radio, to disseminate information about the primary and general elections and the matching funds program.

Matching funds program

New York City’s matching funds program makes the city’s local democracy more accountable, transparent, and inclusive by matching small contributions from everyday New Yorkers to candidates for local office. Candidates for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, borough president, and city council may join the program.

Awareness and participation in the matching funds program continued to grow in 2025.

²² Refers to number of discrete design “assets” created by the CFB.

Figure 2.9: Matching funds program²³

| | |
|--|----------------|
| Number of candidates participating | 275 |
| Proportion of candidates participating | 82.3% |
| Public funds paid | \$87.0 million |
| Total contributions to campaigns | \$41.2 million |
| Number of contributions | 246,409 |
| Average individual contribution | \$162 |
| Proportion of small contributions (\$250 and below) from individuals | 91.2% |

The CFB also distributed a step-by-step guide to understanding the matching funds program to voters as part of a mailer campaign, distributing 3.5 million mailers during the primary election, and over 500,000 mailers during the general election.

A full analysis of the matching funds program will be included in CFB's Post-Election Report, to be released in September 2026.

Debates program

In citywide elections, candidates who participate in the matching funds program are required by the Campaign Finance Act to participate in debates. As such, the CFB oversees the official citywide debates program, setting the priorities and selecting media partners.

To qualify for the debates, candidates must meet nonpartisan, objective criteria, including meeting a fundraising and expenditures threshold.

²³ Includes all participating candidates, including those that did not appear on the ballot.

By the numbers: Voter engagement

The 2025 debates—hosted by lead media sponsors *NBC New York*, *Spectrum NY1*, and *Pix 11*, along with their respective partners and the CFB—attracted significant viewership (especially streaming online), generated a long tail of earned and social media chatter, and made a lasting impact on the elections themselves.

Figure 2.10: Debates

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Number of primary election mayoral debates | 2 |
| Viewers for primary election debates ²⁴ | 4.7 million |
| Number of general election mayoral debates | 2 |
| Viewers for general election debates | 3.5 million |
| Articles about debates | 190 |

Public hearings

In 2025, the CFB held public meetings roughly once a month to review and discuss enforcement issues.

The Voter Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC), which was created in 2010 to advise the Board on voting-related matters, held two public hearings: one on July 9, following the primary election, and a joint hearing with the Board on December 11, following the general election.

Despite the importance of hearing directly from New Yorkers, the VAAC has long-been limited in its effectiveness. It has been without a chair since May 2023, and without new members since December 2024. In the absence of members, these functions have largely been fulfilled by the Board and CFB staff. This report includes a chapter on [Recommendations to strengthen CFB governance](#).

²⁴ Viewership numbers for the NY1 debate includes views of debate content on social platforms.

By the numbers: Voter registration

Key points

- ▶ 94.3% (or 5.3 million) of eligible New Yorkers were registered to vote ahead of the 2025 general election.
- ▶ There was double the number of new voter registrations in 2025 compared to 2021.
- ▶ Brooklyn had the highest registration rate in 2025. The Bronx had the lowest registration rate.
- ▶ Voters under 30 registered at a lower rate (84.4%) than voters over 30 (96.9%).
- ▶ Voters under 30 made up nearly a quarter (24.6%) of all voters unaffiliated with a political party.

By the numbers: Voter registration

In 2025, more than 5.3 million New Yorkers were registered to vote. Figure 2.11 shows the number of eligible voters in the city, the number of registered voters, and the citywide registration rate in 2025.

Figure 2.11: Voter registration in 2025

| Citizens of voting age population ²⁵ | Number of registered voters ²⁶ | Registration rate (% of eligible voting population) |
|---|---|---|
| 5,639,153 | 5,318,294 | 94.3% |

The voter registration rate of 94.3% is the first time since 2021 that the registration rate has surpassed 90%. It is almost a ten-percentage point increase from 2024's registration rate of 85.5%.

Newly registered voters

Newly registered voters are New Yorkers who registered to vote in 2025, before the November general election. Figure 2.12 compares the number of newly registered voters in 2025 to that of 2021

Figure 2.12: Voter registration compared to 2021

| | 2021 | 2025 | Percent increase |
|---|---------|---------|------------------|
| Newly registered voters (by general election registration deadline) | 127,641 | 260,195 | 103.8% |

2025 saw a drastic increase in new voter registrations compared to 2021, at more than double.

25 The estimate for the eligible voting population in NYC comes from the [2024 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates](#).

26 This number was captured as of the 2025 general election registration deadline.

There were 295,465 new voters registered in 2024, a presidential election year that typically sees greater voter engagement than in local election years. While there were fewer new registrants in 2025, it still indicates that the level of engagement was closer to that of a presidential election year than a typical citywide election year. To learn more about newly registered voters, see [In focus: Newly registered voters](#).

Voter registration by location

The CFB analyzes voter registration by geographic location to understand the range of voter engagement across the city. The CFB can better understand each community, its current level of voter engagement, and its needs based on unique characteristics through analyzing voter registration by location. The CFB looks at three main geographical distinctions: borough, community district, and CFB priority community district.

Voter registration by borough

The voter registration rate in 2025 varied across the five boroughs. Brooklyn had the highest registration rate at 97.3%. The Bronx had the lowest registration rate at 92.1%. Figure 2.13 shows the registration rates across all five boroughs.

Figure 2.13: Voter registration by borough

| Borough | Number of registered voters | Registration rate (% of eligible voting population) |
|---------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Bronx | 789,801 | 92.1% |
| Brooklyn | 1,675,259 | 97.3% |
| Manhattan | 1,160,918 | 93.4% |
| Queens | 1,355,109 | 92.8% |
| Staten Island | 337,207 | 94.7% |

By the numbers: Voter registration

Brooklyn not only had the highest registration rate of all boroughs but also had the largest share of voter registrations in 2025. Registrants from Brooklyn made up more than one third (36.6%) of all voter registrations in 2025. Registrants from Staten Island made up just 2.9% of all voter registrations in 2025, the smallest share of all boroughs. This roughly mirrors trends in population share by borough.

Voter registration by community district

The CFB compares voter behavior across community districts to better understand engagement across different communities in the city. While the 2025 citywide average for registration (94.3%) was higher than that of 2021 (90.9%), voter engagement still ranged widely across the city.


Brooklyn community districts held both the highest and lowest registration rates in 2025. Brooklyn Community District 18 (Canarsie and the Flatlands) recorded the highest registration rate of 100%.²⁷ Brooklyn Community District 16 (Ocean Hill and Brownsville) recorded the lowest voter registration rate in the city at 78.9%. See [Appendix A](#) for the 2025 registration rates for all community districts and 2021 comparisons.

Voter registration in CFB priority community districts

The CFB analyzes voter behavior in priority community districts to learn more about the factors that contribute to lower turnout and learn where voter outreach is most needed.

Voter registration rates varied across the CFB's 16 priority community districts.

²⁷ The registration rate is calculated at 126.2%. Registration rates higher than 100% are due to methodology differences in the voter file contents and population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. The number of registered voters (numerator) comes from the City BOE voter file, while the number of eligible voters (denominator) comes from U.S. Census Bureau population estimates.

Figure 2.14: Voter registration by CFB priority community district²⁸

The majority of CFB priority community districts had voter registration rates above the citywide average. Almost all CFB priority community districts had increased voter registration rates compared to 2024.

²⁸ Rates are capped at 100% in the visualization. However, calculated rates may exceed 100% due to methodology differences in the voter file contents and population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. The number of registered voters (numerator) comes from the City BOE voter file, while the number of eligible voters (denominator) comes from U.S. Census Bureau population estimates.;

Some priority community districts have been grouped together in the registration rate calculation because the Citizens of Voting Age Population (CVAP) estimate comes from Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), statistical geographic units that each cover at least 100,000 people. PUMAs are used to approximate NYC community districts but do not always align perfectly with community district boundaries.

Spotlight on Young New Yorkers

The CFB has identified voters under 30 as a priority group due to historic low voter turnout and engagement.²⁹ In the 2024 Voter Analysis Report, the CFB examined the voting behavior of these voters and the policies that impact them. This section builds on last year’s report by examining the registration rates of young voters in 2025.

In 2025, young voters made up nearly two thirds (64.8%) of all new voter registrations. This is an increase from 2024, when young voters made up 54.5% of newly registered voters.³⁰

Despite voters under 30 comprising the largest share of new registrants in 2025, they registered at lower rates than their older peers. Figure 2.15 shows the registration rates for voters under and over 30.

Figure 2.15: Voter registration by age group

| Age group | Registration rate (% of eligible voting population) |
|-----------------|--|
| Voters under 30 | 84.4% |
| Voters over 30 | 96.9% |

Many of the patterns the CFB observed in the 2024 Voter Analysis Report persisted in 2025. Although the registration rate of young voters increased in 2025, there is still more than a ten-percentage point gap between the registration rate of voters under and over the age of 30.

29 This voter bloc is also referred to as “voters ages 18–29” and “young voters.”

30 2024 Voter Analysis Report. “[Voter Registration](#).”

Voter registration by party registration

New Yorkers can choose to register with a specific political party when filling out their registration form, or can choose to remain unaffiliated. Figure 2.16 shows the number of registered voters by party affiliation.

Figure 2.16: Voter registration by party affiliation

| Party affiliation | Number of registered voters | Share of all registered voters |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Democrat | 3,504,482 | 65.9% |
| Unaffiliated | 1,097,407 | 20.6% |
| Republican | 570,848 | 10.7% |
| Other | 101,946 | 1.9% |
| Working Families Party (WFP) | 22,489 | 0.4% |
| Conservative | 21,704 | 0.4% |

Registered Democrats represent the largest share of voters in New York City. Unaffiliated voters, those not registered to a political party, make up the second largest share of voters at 20.6%.

Unaffiliated voters skew younger than the general voting population. Nearly a quarter (24.6%) of the city's unaffiliated voters are under 30, and nearly half (48.4%) of unaffiliated voters are under 40. This remains similar to the composition of voters in 2024. The share of unaffiliated voters declines among older age groups. For example, 10.5% of unaffiliated voters are 60–69 years old. Voters ages 80+ have the lowest share of unaffiliated voters, at 3.6%.

To learn more about how party affiliation impacts voters, refer to the [Recommendation to align registration dates](#).

Pre-registration

In New York, 16- and 17-year-olds are eligible to pre-register to vote if they will otherwise be eligible once they turn 18 years old. The CFB analyzes the pre-registration rate because it can indicate how engaged young people are in the electoral process even before they can vote.

7.0% of young people in New York City pre-registered to vote in 2025. This is an increase since 2024, when the citywide pre-registration rate was 5.2%. In comparison, the statewide pre-registration rate was 21.0%.

Young people typically have the opportunity to pre-register at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) when they are getting a learner's permit or license, or through registration drives. Since 16- and 17-year-olds in the city are less likely to interact with the DMV than their peers across the state, this can contribute to the large gap between the city and state pre-registration rates.³¹ The "Research on Young Voters" chapter of the [2024 Voter Analysis Report](#) discusses the policies and systems that shape New York City's pre-registration rates.

31 Force, Eliot. "[Report: NYC Has Dismal Voter Registration Rates for 18-Year-Olds.](#)" *City & State*. 21 Jun 2024.

By the numbers: Voter turnout

Key points

- ▶ The 2025 city elections saw significantly higher voter turnout than recent city election cycles. Voter turnout in the general election considerably exceeded the 2021 level and marked the highest turnout in a citywide election year in more than 50 years.
- ▶ Increases in voter participation in the primary and general elections were driven in part by newly registered voters, who turned out at double the rate of voters who were registered for more than one year.
- ▶ Participation among younger voters (under 40) surged compared to prior city elections. In a reversal of previous trends, they made up the largest share of voters in both the primary and general elections.
- ▶ Despite widespread gains in voter turnout citywide, rates remained uneven across boroughs and particularly by community district. Most CFB priority community districts remained below the citywide average turnout.


Voter turnout during the 2025 election cycle increased substantially across New York City. Municipal elections typically see comparatively low participation relative to national election years. In 2025, however, participation rose in both the primary and general elections, with especially pronounced gains in the latter. The patterns in 2025 suggest a city election cycle that had voters turning out at levels not commonly associated with municipal races. This increase was driven in part by strong participation among newly registered voters and younger voters.

Figure 2.17: Voter turnout, special, primary, and general elections

| Election | Voters | Turnout |
|---|-----------|---------|
| Primary Election | 1,107,203 | 29.9% |
| General Election | 2,215,088 | 41.6% |
| Special Election - Brooklyn Council District 44 | 5,598 | 7.6% |
| Special Election - Staten Island Council District 51 | 9,580 | 8.2% |
| Special Election - Brooklyn State Senate District 22 | 13,237 | 9.0% |

Participation levels varied throughout the 2025 primary, general, and special elections. In the primary election, 1.1 million city residents cast their ballots, representing 29.9% of the electorate. In the general election, voter turnout increased further, with 2.2 million voters, or 41.6% of eligible registered voters, participating.

Figure 2.18: Percent of registered and actual voters, 2025 general election



In contrast, turnout in the three special elections held in 2025 remained typically low, ranging from 7.6% to 9.0%. These low participation rates are consistent with special election participation in New York City and highlight the difficulty of engaging voters in off-cycle races.

Voter turnout over time

Understanding the unique level of voter engagement in the 2025 election cycle requires placing the 2025 election cycle in context with prior city election years. Comparing turnout in 2017, 2021, and 2025 illustrates how participation has fluctuated across election years, and how the 2025 races represented a departure from historical patterns.

While comparisons to prior election cycles provide useful context for the 2025 data, each cycle is shaped by its own distinct factors that influence voter participation. The 2017 cycle featured a citywide mayoral race that was widely viewed as noncompetitive, with an incumbent seeking a second term. In contrast, 2021 saw an open and highly competitive mayoral contest. In New York City, Democratic primary elections have traditionally been more competitive than general elections, as they effectively determine the nominee in a city with a heavily Democratic electorate. Breaking from this pattern, the 2025 general election proved unusually competitive, driven largely by major Democratic candidates running on independent lines.

Figure 2.19: Voter turnout, primary elections, 2017, 2021, and 2025

| | 2017 | 2021 | 2025 |
|----------------|---------|-----------|-----------|
| Voters | 457,111 | 1,013,427 | 1,107,203 |
| Turnout | 14.6% | 26.5% | 29.9% |

Figure 2.20: Voter turnout, general elections, 2017, 2021, and 2025

| | 2017 | 2021 | 2025 |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Voters | 1,149,469 | 1,147,555 | 2,215,088 |
| Turnout | 25.2% | 23.3% | 41.6% |

By the numbers: Voter turnout

The 2025 municipal election reversed typical trends for citywide elections. Turnout in the 2025 general election (41.6%) substantially exceeded participation levels in both the 2017 (25.2%) and 2021 (23.3%) city elections. For example, the voter turnout in 2025 was 18.3 percentage points higher than the 2021 voter turnout rate. Turnout in the primary election (29.9%) also increased compared to 2017 (14.6%) and 2021 (26.5%). The most significant shift occurred in the general election, where participation increased sharply compared to both prior city cycles.

Newly registered voters

Newly registered voters were a central feature of the 2025 electorate and a key contributing factor to the increased voter turnout. Historically, newly registered voters participate at relatively low rates in city elections. In 2025, however, newly registered voters were not only a meaningful share of new registrants but also turned out at high rates.

In the primary election, newly registered voters turned out at high levels (59.6%), double the turnout of longer-registered voters (29.1%). New registrants in 2025 turned out at nearly 20 percentage points higher than they did in 2021 (39.8%).

In the 2025 general election, newly registered voters turned out at a rate of 61.8%, 20.2 percentage points higher than voters who had been registered for more than a year (40.6%). This rate tripled compared to the 18.5% turnout among newly registered voters in 2021.

Taken together, these rates demonstrate how new voter registrations translated into real election participation. Additional analysis of these new voters is explored in the [In focus: Newly registered voters](#) section.

Voter turnout by borough

Voter turnout ranged across boroughs in the 2025 election cycle. In the 2025 primary, Manhattan recorded the highest voter turnout, while Staten Island recorded the lowest turnout. Gains in primary turnout were largely concentrated in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Turnout remained relatively similar in Queens and the Bronx and declined by approximately six percentage points in Staten Island.

Figure 2.21: Voter turnout by borough, primary elections, 2021 and 2025

| Borough | 2021 | | 2025 | |
|---------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| | Voters | Turnout | Voters | Turnout |
| Bronx | 117,445 | 19.1% | 117,331 | 20.6% |
| Brooklyn | 336,591 | 27.5% | 394,800 | 33.2% |
| Manhattan | 274,264 | 33.4% | 322,792 | 40.5% |
| Queens | 233,836 | 25.0% | 236,074 | 25.7% |
| Staten Island | 51,291 | 22.4% | 36,206 | 16.2% |
| Citywide | 1,013,427 | 26.5% | 1,107,203 | 29.9% |

On the other hand, the general election saw double-digit increases in every borough.

Figure 2.22: Voter turnout by borough, general elections, 2021 and 2025

| Borough | 2021 | | 2025 | |
|---------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| | Voters | Turnout | Voters | Turnout |
| Bronx | 133,923 | 17.5% | 239,441 | 30.3% |
| Brooklyn | 345,238 | 22.4% | 715,333 | 42.7% |
| Manhattan | 274,879 | 26.3% | 562,690 | 48.5% |
| Queens | 286,445 | 22.9% | 543,856 | 40.1% |
| Staten Island | 107,070 | 33.7% | 153,768 | 45.6% |
| Citywide | 1,147,555 | 23.3% | 2,215,088 | 41.6% |

By the numbers: Voter turnout

Borough turnout rates in the 2025 general election also show geographic variation in voter participation. Manhattan led the city with a 48.5% turnout rate, followed closely by Staten Island at 45.6%. Brooklyn and Queens saw turnout rates of 42.7% and 40.1%, respectively, while the Bronx recorded the lowest turnout at 30.3%.

Across all boroughs, voter turnout increased significantly compared with the 2021 city election. Manhattan experienced the largest increase in turnout, increasing by 22 percentage points. Brooklyn also experienced one of the largest increases in participation, improving turnout by around 20 percentage points from 2021. The Bronx, while still the lowest-turnout borough, increased turnout by about 13 percentage points from 17.5% in 2021. Although varying in magnitude, all boroughs experienced double-digit percentage point increases in turnout compared with 2021.


Overall, the borough-level data underscores the consistent improvement in citywide engagement in the 2025 general election, whereas increases in primary turnout were more uneven and geographically dependent.

Voter turnout by community district

Turnout in the 2025 election varied widely across community districts, reflecting persistent neighborhood-level differences in participation, even during an election cycle with atypically high turnout.³²


In the 2025 primary election, community districts in most of Manhattan, North and South Brooklyn, and parts of Queens recorded the highest turnout rates. In comparison, community districts throughout the Bronx, Staten Island, Central and eastern Brooklyn, and eastern Queens saw the lowest turnout rates.

32 Community districts are used as a proxy for neighborhoods.

Figure 2.23: Voter turnout by community district, primary election

In the general election, community districts in most of Manhattan, South Brooklyn, and the southern part of Staten Island recorded the highest turnout rates, while community districts throughout the Bronx and Central Brooklyn saw the lowest turnout rates.

Figure 2.24: Voter turnout by community district, general election



In the general election, every community district saw an increase when compared to its 2021 rate. Despite this, there was still variability across neighborhoods. Community districts that historically record higher turnout continued to do so, while many districts with lower participation in past elections remained below citywide levels.

Turnout patterns in CFB priority community districts followed these broader geographic trends.


Voter turnout in priority community districts

CFB priority community districts are neighborhoods that have historically faced barriers to electoral participation and have thus been the focus of targeted CFB voter engagement efforts.

In 2025, most CFB priority districts recorded increased turnout in the primary election and all of them had increased turnout in the general election, compared to the 2021 city election. However, most priority districts still recorded turnout below citywide turnout rate in both the primary and general elections.

In the 2025 primary election, 15 of the 16 CFB priority community districts fell below the overall 2025 citywide average primary turnout rate of 29.9%.


Figure 2.25: Voter turnout in CFB priority community districts, primary election



Brooklyn Community District 7 (Sunset Park, Windsor Terrace) saw the greatest turnout by over 10 percentage points compared to the next-highest CFB priority district. This community district overlaps with Council Districts 38 and 39, both of which saw well-funded challenges against incumbents Alexa Avilés and Shahana Hanif, which likely drove voter engagement in this community district in 2025.³³

33 Novikoff, Devyn. “[Alexa Avilés Keeps Her Seat in Council District 38.](#)” *City & State*. 25 Jun 2025.

Figure 2.26: Voter turnout in CFB priority community districts, general election



In the 2025 general election, turnout in priority community districts ranged from 23.2% in Bronx Community District 6 (Tremont, Belmont, and West Farms) to 47.0% in Brooklyn Community District 15 (Sheepshead Bay and Gravesend). Brooklyn Council District 15 (Sheepshead Bay-Gravesend) turnout was likely driven by the competitiveness of the race for Council District 47, which saw Kayla Santosuosso win the seat vacated by Justin Brannan.³⁴ Fourteen of the 16 CFB priority community districts recorded turnout below the citywide

34 Salazar, Amanda. "[Kayla Santosuosso Wins Southern Brooklyn City Council Race.](#)" *City & State*. 5 Nov 2025.

By the numbers: Voter turnout

general election turnout rate of 41.6%. While all CFB priority districts saw an increase in turnout compared to 2021, most priority districts still did not reach the citywide turnout rate.

A complete table of voter turnout by community district with comparisons to 2021 is provided in [Appendix B](#).

Voter turnout by age

Age-based voter turnout patterns in 2025 highlight a notable shift in who participated in local New York City elections. While older voters continued to cast their vote at high rates, younger voters participated at substantially higher levels than in prior city elections. As a result, young voters significantly reshaped the age composition of the electorate in both the primary and general elections.

In the primary election, patterns of turnout by age shifted the furthest. More than a third (35.2%) of young voters ages 18 to 29 turned out to vote, representing the highest turnout rate of any age group, and more than doubling their 17.9% turnout in the 2021 primary.

Figure 2.27: Voter turnout by age group, primary elections, 2021 and 2025

| Age group | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
|-----------|-------|-------|-----------------------------|
| 18–29 | 17.9% | 35.2% | 17.3 |
| 30–39 | 21.7% | 30.8% | 9.1 |
| 40–49 | 24.0% | 26.4% | 2.4 |
| 50–59 | 28.8% | 27.3% | -1.5 |
| 60–69 | 35.3% | 30.9% | -4.4 |
| 70–79 | 37.7% | 33.6% | -4.1 |
| 80+ | 23.2% | 20.9% | -2.3 |

In the 2025 general election, voters averaged 50 years old, just one year older than the average registered voter (49). This is meaningfully younger than the 2021 general election, when the average voter was 55. Although voters ages 60 to 69 and 70 to 79 led turnout rates in the 2025 general election (47.9% and 48.7%, respectively), the most striking change occurred among younger voters. Voters ages 18 to 29 turned out at 41.9%, more than triple their 11.1% turnout in 2021. Turnout also rose sharply among voters ages 30 to 39 (from 16.3% to 37.2%) and voters ages 40 to 49 (from 22.1% to 39.2%).

Figure 2.28: Voter turnout by age group, general elections, 2021 and 2025


| Age group | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
|-----------|-------|-------|-----------------------------|
| 18–29 | 11.1% | 41.9% | 30.8 |
| 30–39 | 16.3% | 37.2% | 20.9 |
| 40–49 | 22.1% | 39.2% | 17.1 |
| 50–59 | 28.7% | 44.7% | 16.0 |
| 60–69 | 35.4% | 47.9% | 12.5 |
| 70–79 | 37.9% | 48.7% | 10.8 |
| 80+ | 23.2% | 30.2% | 7.0 |

New York City municipal elections typically see the highest levels of participation in the Democratic primary, which often determines the eventual outcome of the general election, given the large share of registered Democrats in New York City. In 2025, however, the general election was unusually competitive, and turnout increased substantially across age groups as a result. Taken together, these figures emphasize that gains in voter turnout in 2025 included not only voters who traditionally participate in local elections but also included a substantial rise in participation among younger city residents.

Voter turnout by party affiliation

Voter turnout in the 2025 general election differed across party affiliation. These variations provide context for which groups were most engaged and how their participation shifted compared with the 2021 city election.

Figure 2.29: Voter turnout by party affiliation, general elections, 2021 and 2025



Voter turnout in 2025 increased significantly across all political party affiliations compared with the city election in 2021. In the 2025 general election, Democratic and Republican voters turned out to vote at similar rates, with 45.1% of registered Democrats and 45.6% of registered Republicans casting their ballots. Turnout among Conservative Party and Working Families Party (WFP) voters was also relatively high, reaching 40.7% and 39.4% respectively. Compared to the 2021 city election, turnout among Democratic, Republican, and Conservative Party voters increased markedly, up from participation levels that ranged between approximately 25.3% and 30.9%. Notably, WFP voters experienced the largest increase in turnout from 2021 to 2025, rising 24.1 percentage points from the turnout rate of 15.3% in 2021.

In the 2025 general election, unaffiliated voters turned out at a rate of 29.6%, an 18.2 percentage point increase from 2021. However, despite gains in turnout across parties, turnout among unaffiliated voters remained distinctly lower than that of voters registered with a political party, consistent with prior trends.

Overall, the 2025 city election cycle marked a departure from typical municipal election patterns in New York City. Voter turnout in the city saw major increases in the primary election and particularly in the general election. This was driven in large part by strong engagement among newly registered and younger voters. Although participation increased across the city, turnout still varied by borough, community district, and voter characteristics. These patterns highlight that the 2025 election cycle drew a much larger electorate than recent city elections, even as longstanding gaps across neighborhoods persisted.

By the numbers: Voting method

Key points

- ▶ New Yorkers can vote using multiple methods, including in person on election day, in person early voting, vote by mail, and more.
- ▶ All age groups tended to favor the same kinds of voting methods across the primary and general elections.
- ▶ New Yorkers first had the chance to use in-person early voting in 2019 and vote by mail in 2024. In-person early voting quickly became popular after it was implemented.

New Yorkers can cast their ballots using several methods, some of which are recent policy changes. Figure 2.30 defines the various voting methods.

Figure 2.30: Definitions of voting methods

| Voting method | Definition ³⁵ |
|-------------------------------|---|
| In person on election day | This method allows voters to vote in person on election day at the voter’s designated poll site. |
| In person during early voting | This method allows voters to vote in person in the ten days leading up to election day. Poll sites for early voting may differ from a voter’s election day poll site. This policy first went into effect in 2019. |

35 New York State Board of Elections. [“Ways to Vote.”](#)

| Voting method | Definition ³⁵ |
|---------------|---|
| Vote by mail | <p>There are two ways to vote by mail: Absentee and “no excuses” Vote by mail. While absentee voting is one of the oldest alternatives to voting in person, its popularity has decreased since the introduction of “no excuses” vote by mail.</p> <p><u>Absentee</u></p> <p>This method allows voters to cast a mail ballot if they cannot vote in person on election day because of one of the reasons outlined below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The voter is absent from the city on election day.• The voter has a temporary or permanent disability or illness.• The voter is the primary caretaker for individuals who are ill or physically disabled.• The voter resides in or is a patient of the Veterans Health Administration Hospital.• The voter is in jail or prison for any reason other than a felony. <p><u>Vote by mail</u></p> <p>This method allows voters to vote by mail without providing a qualifying reason. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, state lawmakers temporarily permitted all voters to safely cast their ballots from home without needing to cite a reason. This policy went into permanent effect in 2024.</p> |

| Voting method | Definition ³⁵ |
|---------------------|--|
| <p>Other</p> | <p><u>Military ballots</u></p> <p>This is a specific type of mail ballot for voters in the military who are away due to the conditions of their service.</p> <p><u>Affidavit ballots</u></p> <p>This is a special ballot voters can use if they are told they are not permitted to vote in person at a specific poll site, but they are generally eligible to vote. Qualifying instances include when a voter’s name can’t be found in the pollbook, the voter isn’t registered to the political party they expect to be, or they are registered but are at the wrong poll-site.</p> <p>If the voter believes they are eligible to vote at this poll site, they can use an affidavit ballot. Upon receiving the affidavit ballot, the City BOE confirms the voter’s status and counts the vote.³⁶</p> |

In 2025, New Yorkers used every voting method at different rates. However, rates of voting method usage remained relatively consistent between the primary and general elections. Voting in person on election day remained the most popular method for the primary election (56.9%) and the general election (58.0%). The second most popular method was voting in person during the early voting period. More than a third of voters used this method during the primary (34.5%) and general elections (33.1%). Figure 2.31 illustrates the rates at which voters used each voting method during the primary and general elections in 2025.

36 New York City Board of Elections. “[FAQs.](#)”

Figure 2.31: Voting method shares in 2025, primary election


| Voting method | June primary | November general |
|---|--------------|------------------|
| Election day | 56.9% | 58% |
| In-person early | 34.5% | 33.1% |
| Vote by mail | 7.0% | 7.1% |
| Other (includes special, affidavit, and military ballots) | 1.7% | 1.9% |

Voting method by age

While voting in person was by far the most popular vote method for all voters, examining what age groups used which vote methods can reveal trends.


By the numbers: Voting method

Figure 2.32: Age distribution of voters by voting method, primary election³⁷



³⁷ Affidavit votes have been separated from “other” vote methods for this data visualization. The remaining vote methods in the “other” category make up less than 0.1% of all ballots in the primary election. They are not shown in this figure.

Figure 2.33: Age distribution of voters by voting method, general election³⁸



Voters under 40 held the greatest share of every vote method except for vote by mail. Voters over the age of 60 cast the most votes by mail in both the primary and general elections.

38 Affidavit votes have been separated from the remaining “other” vote methods for this data visualization. The remaining vote methods in the “other” category make up 0.1% of all ballots in the general election. They are not shown in this figure.

By the numbers: Voting method

Young voters cast more than a third of all affidavit ballots in the primary and general elections (39.7% and 35.2% respectively). As previously mentioned, affidavit ballots are most commonly issued for the following reasons: a voter's name cannot be found in the poll book, the voter is not registered to the political party they expected to be, the voter is registered but showed up to the wrong poll site, or the voter is inactive because they have not voted in recent years. High rates of affidavit ballot usage among younger voters indicates that this group might be more unfamiliar with the voting process, might have higher rates of movement within and into the city, and/or might display more inconsistent voting patterns.³⁹ As mentioned in [By the numbers: Voter registration](#), young voters had high registration rates in 2025, which can naturally contribute to a higher share of potential mistakes or discrepancies with voter registration.

Voting method usage over time


The introduction of early voting in 2019 and vote by mail in 2024 expanded New Yorkers' options in casting their ballots.⁴⁰ Early voting extended election day from just one day to a nearly two-week period in which New Yorkers can now choose to vote in person at their convenience. Vote by mail allowed New Yorkers to cast a mail ballot without providing one of the few approved reasons that would qualify them for an absentee ballot.

Voting in person on election day has remained the most popular voting method since 2019, despite the introduction of new voting methods. Figure 2.34 shows how popularity in voting method usage changed from 2019 through the 2025 general election.

39 A voter could need an affidavit ballot if they are not found in the voter roll at their poll site due to a discrepancy in their registered address. Sometimes, if voters register or change their address closer to the deadline, voter rolls are not updated in time, and the Board of Elections will verify registration upon receiving the affidavit ballot. This is why affidavit ballots can be related to last-minute registration or higher rates of registration; New York City Board of Elections. "[Basic Poll Worker Manual](#)." 2025.

40 New York State Election Law § [8-600](#).; New York State Election Law § [8-700](#).

Figure 2.34: Voting method shares by election, 2019 to 2025⁴¹



Voting in person on election day has been, and remains, the most popular voting method, despite a dip in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the 2020 primary election, voting in person during early voting became the second most popular method and has remained as such. While voting in person on election day continues to be the most popular vote method, the gap between in-person election day voting and in-person early voting has shrunk in recent election cycles.

Overall, 2025 saw a continuation of recent trends, with the vast majority of voters continuing to vote in person, either early or on election day.

41 The “other” vote method category has been excluded from this visualization due to low usage rates.

By the numbers: On the ballot

Key points

- ▶ The 2025 citywide election cycle included races for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, borough presidents, city council members, and other races depending on election district, plus six ballot proposals.
- ▶ All but one of the five citywide ballot proposals were approved. Ballot Proposal 6, which would make progress towards moving city elections to even-numbered years to match federal presidential election years, did not pass.
- ▶ New York City voters supported the five citywide ballot proposals, Ballot Proposals 2 through 6, at higher rates than Ballot Proposal 1, the statewide constitutional amendment. Despite the fact that the majority of New York City voters opposed it, Ballot Proposal 1 passed due to higher statewide support.
- ▶ Trends in ballot drop-off rates—the rate at which voters tend to start skipping down-ballot races—in the 2025 general election ballot differed from previous election cycles. Historically, drop-off rates have increased consistently as the ballot progresses, through down-ballot contests and ballot proposals. In 2025, Ballot Proposal 2 and 3 received more votes than Ballot Proposal 1.

In June 2025, New York City conducted primary elections for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, borough president for Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx, and 30 of the 51 city council districts.⁴² In November 2025, the city held the general election for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, borough president for all five boroughs, and city council races for all 51 council districts. The general election ballots also included six ballot proposals for voters to consider.


42 The 2025 primary elections included races in 30 City Council Districts. Because Council District 47 held both Democratic and Republican primary races, the total number of City Council races was 31.

Depending on a voter's location, ballots also included additional non-city offices. In Brooklyn and Manhattan, ballots included a district attorney election. In other areas, ballots included delegates to the judicial convention, alternate delegates to the judicial convention, and political party county committee and district leader positions.

The Ballot

Ballot design in New York City is highly regulated by New York State Election Law. The format and structure of a voter's ballot are shaped primarily by legal mandates rather than administrative discretion. These requirements can impact factors such as the ballot's visual complexity and overall length, which in turn directly affects voters' experience.

As policymakers evaluate voter behavior and participation patterns, it is important to consider how these legal requirements influence ballot readability and navigation. A clearer understanding of these structural factors can inform future discussions about refinements to ballot design.



Ballot Order

New York State law requires political parties to be listed in descending order based on the number of votes received by their gubernatorial candidate in the most recent election (in this case, the 2022 gubernatorial election).⁴³ In 2025, this requirement resulted in the Democratic nominee appearing first on the ballot, followed by the Republican nominee and other parties in order of prior gubernatorial vote totals. Independent candidates, who are not nominated by any political party, appeared after party nominees. The New York City Board of Elections determined that independent candidates are to be arranged based on the order in which they filed their petitions to run.⁴⁴

New York State Election Law also requires separate columns or rows for each recognized political party and for independent bodies that nominate candidates. Candidates who choose to run exclusively on independent lines therefore appear in their own section of the ballot, regardless of any prior party affiliation.⁴⁵ Due to space constraints, independent candidates or nominating groups are assigned a letter in order of their appearance on the ballot. While they may share a column, they are identified by that letter across offices. In 2025, some candidates who did not secure or pursue party nominations appeared solely on independent lines in the general election, and their ballot placement reflected nomination status.

Fusion Voting

New York State permits fusion voting, in which a candidate may receive nominations from more than one political party. State law requires that general election ballots list each nomination separately.⁴⁶ As a result, candidates endorsed by multiple parties appeared multiple times on 2025 general election ballots, once under each party line.

43 New York State Election Law § [7-116\(1\)\(2\)](#).

44 McCarthy, Bill. “[Elon Musk, Eric Trump Mislead on New York City Ballot Design](#).” *AFP*. 4 Nov 2025.; New York City Board of Elections. “[Independent Nominating Petition Guidelines](#).” 11 Feb 2025.

45 New York State Election Law §§ [7-104\(4\)\(a\)](#) and [7-116\(1\)\(2\)](#).

46 New York State Election Law §§ [7-104\(4\)\(b\)\(e\)](#) and [9-112\(4\)](#).

The final vote count then aggregates votes cast for a candidate across all party lines. For reporting purposes, votes are attributed to the first party line on which the voter marked a vote for that candidate. From a ballot design perspective, however, listing each nomination separately increases the number of entries on the ballot and contributes to its overall length and density.

Nomination and Withdrawal Deadline

New York State law establishes mandatory deadlines for candidates to accept or decline nominations and for the New York City and New York State Boards of Elections to certify ballots. After these deadlines pass, candidates remain on the ballot unless specific exceptions apply, such as disqualification, acceptance of nomination for a different office, or death.⁴⁷

In 2025, several mayoral candidates ceased active campaigning and publicly withdrew from the race. However, because these withdrawals occurred after the June 27 deadline established by law, those candidates remained listed on the general election ballot as candidates for voters to select. As the Voter Guide is based on ballot content, this also meant that these candidates continued to appear in the Voter Guide.

Why these administrative and design choices matter

Ballot design is important—to ensure that the ballot itself is objective and nonpartisan, but also to ensure it is clear and user-friendly for voters. While New York City’s ballot design has previously drawn critiques from nonpartisan policy organizations, the national attention of the 2025 general election saw a wider range of critics weighing in on its design, including the spreading of misinformation on election day.⁴⁸ The misinformation was so widespread that the CFB released its own social media content to address this misinformation.⁴⁹

47 New York State Election Law §§ [1-106\(2\)](#), [6-122](#), [6-146\(5\)](#), [6-148\(1\)](#), and [6-158\(11\)](#).

48 Lopez, Tomas. “[Poor Ballot Design Hurts New York’s Minor Parties...Again.](#)” The Brennan Center for Justice. 23 Oct 2014.; @elonmusk. “[The New York City ballot form is a scam!...](#)” X. 4 Nov 2025.

49 @NYCVotes. “[Setting the record straight on Election Day...](#)” X. 4 Nov 2025.

Ballot proposals

In addition to candidate contests, New Yorkers' 2025 general election ballots included six proposals suggesting changes to the State Constitution and the New York City Charter. The CFB plays a role through its voter outreach efforts to inform the public about the ballot proposals. Separately, several non-government organizations publicly took positions on the measures appearing on the 2025 ballot.⁵⁰ The first proposal would amend the New York State Constitution; it needed approval from voters statewide and therefore appeared on all ballots across New York State. The remaining five proposals were placed on the ballot by the 2025 Charter Revision Commission, which reviewed the New York City Charter and held public hearings before advancing proposed amendments for voter consideration.⁵¹

Ballot proposals allow voters to directly decide on the changes they want to see passed. The 2025 ballot included the following six proposals:

1. **Amendment to allow Olympic Sports Complex in Essex County on state forest preserve land.**
 - a. This proposal would amend the New York State Constitution to permit the expansion of ski trails at the Olympic Sports Complex in Essex County, located on state forest preserve land. The amendment would also require the State to add 2,500 acres of protected forest land to Adirondack Park.
2. **Fast track affordable housing to build more affordable housing across the city.**
 - a. This proposal would establish two new processes to expedite certain affordable housing projects. The first applies to publicly financed affordable housing projects, while the second applies to affordable housing projects specifically located in the 12 community districts with the lowest rates of affordable housing development.

50 New York City League of Women Voters. "[Proposals on the Ballot in New York City in the 2025 General Election.](#)"; Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development. "[Yes on 2! 2025 Ballot Campaign.](#)"; The Municipal Art Society of New York. "[MAS Statement on the 2025 General Election: Vote YES on Ballot Proposals 2, 3, and 4.](#)"; Adirondack Council. "[Vote YES on Proposal 1 on Election Day.](#)"; The Brennan Center for Justice. "[Re: Comment on the Effect of Moving Municipal Elections to Even-Numbered Years.](#)" 15 Apr 2025.; New York Civil Liberties Union. "[Why New Yorkers Should Vote 'Yes' on Proposal 1.](#)"; New York League of Conservation Voters. "[2025 General Election: Vote Yes on Props 1, 3, and 6.](#)"; Citizens Union. "[Citizens Union Announces Support for All 2025 Ballot Questions.](#)"; Zaveri, Mihir. "[PAC Plans to Spend \\$3 Million as Fight on Housing Measures Heats Up.](#)" *The New York Times*. 8 Sep 2025.

51 NYC Votes. "[2025 Ballot Proposals.](#)"

3. **Simplify review of modest housing and infrastructure projects.**
 - a. This proposal would create a faster review process for certain land use projects. For most projects, this would mean that final review by the city council would be eliminated.
4. **Establish an Affordable Housing Appeals Board with council, borough, and citywide representation.**
 - a. This proposal would authorize the creation of an Affordable Housing Appeals Board empowered to reverse a city council decision to reject or modify an affordable housing project by a two-to-one vote. The Board would be made up of the local borough president, the speaker of the city council, and the mayor.
5. **Create a digital city map to modernize city operations.**
 - a. This proposal would require the Department of City Planning (DCP) to create, maintain, and digitize a consolidated city map.
6. **Move local elections to presidential election years to increase voter participation.**
 - a. This proposal would move to shift elections for city offices to coincide with federal presidential election years. The recommendation was informed in part by research conducted by the CFB and was included as a recommendation in the 2023 and 2024 Voter Analysis Reports.⁵²

Ballot proposal results

In New York City, 45.5% of voters supported Ballot Proposal 1, compared with 58.0% of voters in the rest of New York State.

Statewide proposal

Figure 2.35: Percent of “yes” votes for statewide ballot proposal, general election

| NYC “yes” votes | Outside of NYC “yes” votes | Overall statewide “yes” votes |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 45.5% | 58.0% | 51.9% |

52 2023 Voter Analysis Report. [“Policy and Program Recommendations.”](#)


By the numbers: On the ballot

Despite an approximately 12 percentage point gap between New York City and the rest of the State, the proposal passed with 51.9% support across all of New York State.

Citywide proposals

Voters in New York City supported the five citywide ballot proposals at higher rates than the statewide constitutional amendment. All but one of the citywide proposals passed.

Figure 2.36: Percent of “yes” votes for citywide ballot proposals, general election




Ballot Proposals 2 through 4 on affordable housing passed with support between 55.0% and 60.0%. Ballot Proposal 5, which proposed consolidating five separate borough-based paper maps into a single digital city map, received the highest level of support among all proposals, at 73.6%. Ballot Proposal 6, which proposed moving local elections from odd-numbered years to even-numbered presidential elections years, did not pass. The proposal received only 47.2% “yes” votes.

Although the majority of ballot proposals were approved, support levels were generally lower than historical averages. With the exception of Ballot Proposal 5, each proposal received less support than has been observed across the past seven election cycles. Between 2018 and 2024, the average “yes” vote across all ballot proposals in New York City was 70.0%.

Ballot proposal drop-off rates

Ballot drop-off rates measure the share of voters who cast a ballot in an election but do not record a vote for a particular race or ballot proposal. In the CFB's analysis, drop-off rates are measured as response rate deficits of each ballot proposal relative to the total number of ballots cast. Voters may choose to skip a race or proposal for several reasons, including ballot length and voter fatigue, lack of familiarity with the issue, their dissatisfaction with or lack of preference for the available candidates, or the office or proposal's perceived relevance. While drop-off rates do not clarify the exact reasons for decreased voter participation in certain contests, they can provide insight into voter engagement beyond overall turnout and help the CFB evaluate how ballot design or structure may affect participation in down-ballot contests.

Figure 2.37: Ballot proposal votes and drop-off rates, general election



Among voters who cast ballots for a candidate in all possible races, the drop-off rate for Ballot Proposal 1 was 16.1%, meaning 16.1% of voters did not select a response for Ballot Proposal 1. Ballot Proposals 2 and 3 saw the lowest drop-off rates, and Ballot Proposal 2 showed a notable improvement in voter participation with a 14.6% drop-off rate—a decrease of 1.5 percentage points compared to Proposal 1. Ballot Proposal 3 recorded a 15.8% drop-off rate—a 1.2 percentage point increase from Proposal 2.

By the numbers: On the ballot

Participation declined for the remaining proposals. Ballot Proposal 4 reached a 16.3% drop-off rate, a smaller increase of 0.5 percentage points from Proposal 3, while Ballot Proposal 5 maintained the same elevated drop-off-rate as Proposal 4. Ballot Proposal 6, which appeared last on the ballot, recorded the highest drop-off rate at 16.5%, an additional increase of 0.2 percentage points from Proposals 4 and 5.

Historically, the first proposals on the ballot tend to receive lower drop-off rates, with participation declining toward the end of the ballot. Prior reports have identified a tendency for voters to respond to earlier questions and gradually disengage as they move through the ballot.⁵³

Overall, voter participation peaked at Ballot Proposal 2, after which drop-off rates increased steadily and remained consistently elevated for subsequent proposals. This pattern suggests that voters were more likely to engage with Proposals 2 and 3. The higher participation levels for these measures may reflect greater outreach or public familiarity with the proposals as both proposals saw independent expenditures and city council mailers advocating for each position. In contrast, Ballot Proposal 1 may have felt less directly relevant to some New York City voters because of the geographical distance from Essex County in upstate New York.

53 2023 Voter Analysis Report. [“On the Ballot in 2023.”](#)

In Focus

In focus: Newly registered voters

Key points

- ▶ New voter registrations in 2025 more closely resembled that of a presidential election year rather than a city one. The number of registrations more than doubled compared to the last city election (from 127,641 new registrants in 2021 to 260,195 in 2025).
- ▶ Registration deadlines largely drove the timing of voter registration activity. Registrations spiked sharply right before eligibility cut-offs for the primary and general elections.
- ▶ Newly registered voters cast ballots at significantly higher rates in the 2025 general election than in prior city elections. New voters in the 2025 general election turned out at 61.7%, compared to 18.5% in the 2021 general election.
- ▶ Younger voters drove much of the increase in registrations and participation. Voters ages 18 to 29 accounted for nearly two-thirds of all new registrations.
- ▶ These younger new voters also turned out at higher rates than in prior city elections. 18–29-year-old new voters turned out at 61.6% in the 2025 general election, compared to 14.1% in the 2021 general election. The scale of the change in youth engagement in the 2025 election suggests a shift in voter behavior that goes beyond population aging and routine election outreach efforts.

New voter registrations surged in 2025 in New York City.⁵⁴ The number of newly registered voters in 2025 more than doubled compared with the last city election in 2021 and narrowed the typical registration and turnout gap between local city elections and presidential


54 In this report, “new voters” refers to those who are newly registered in New York City. This includes voters who are registering for the first time, but also voters who may have existed on voter rolls but have updated registration, for example, those who have moved to New York City.

elections. The scale of new registration activity suggests that the 2025 cycle engaged voters in ways not usually observed in city elections. This section explores who these new registrants were, when they registered, how they participated in the 2025 citywide election, and what distinguished this election cycle from prior city elections.

Year-by-year comparison of new registrants

Comparing registration trends across multiple local election cycles helps contextualize the substantial increase in 2025. A total of 260,195 eligible city residents registered to vote for the first time in 2025, more than double the number of new registrants during the 2021 city election cycle. The comparison below highlights how 2025 represents a meaningful departure from long-term trends.

Figure 3.1: Number of newly registered voters by year, 2017 to 2025




In focus: Newly registered voters

The registration rate reached 94.3% of the eligible voting population in 2025, an 8.8 percentage point increase in voter registration over the prior year. While still slightly below the 295,465 new registrants seen during the 2024 presidential election year, voter registration activity in 2025 more closely resembled that of a presidential election year rather than of a typical city election cycle.

Breakdown of new registrations throughout 2025

Although new voter registrations surged in 2025, the timing of registrations did not occur evenly throughout the election cycle. Instead, registration activity clustered around key registration deadlines tied to eligibility to vote in the primary and general elections.

Figure 3.2: Daily voter registrations in 2025



Of all new registrants in 2025, nearly half (125,691 voters) registered in time to vote in the primary election, and the remaining just over half (135,504) registered after the primary registration deadline but in time to vote in the general election.⁵⁵

Figure 3.3: Number of new voters in 2025

| | Registered before the June primary deadline | Registered after the June primary deadline and before the November general deadline |
|----------------------|---|---|
| Number of new voters | 125,691 | 135,504 |

The largest spike in registrations occurred immediately before the primary election registration deadline, when 16,505 voters registered in a single day. The day preceding the deadline also saw elevated registration activity, underscoring a strong tendency for voters to register at the last available opportunity. In comparison, the single-day peak during the 2021 city election cycle was much smaller, at 2,868 voters. The 2025 peak was therefore more than five times higher than the highest daily registration total recorded in 2021.

A second, smaller surge occurred ahead of the general election registration deadline, when 6,560 new voters registered. While still substantial, this increase was notably lower than the primary-related peak, indicating that primary deadlines generated greater urgency or engagement among new registrants in 2025.

Additionally, more than 6,000 voters registered on election day for the primary election, even though this was past the voter registration deadline—the deadline to register to vote is on the first day of early voting, ten days before election day. This points to possible misunderstandings and confusion around voter registration deadlines. Further information about how voter registration deadlines impact voters can be found in the [Recommendation to align registration dates](#).


⁵⁵ New voter registrations are measured from January 1, 2025 through the voter registration deadline for the 2025 general election. Voters who registered after the deadline are not included because they were not eligible to vote in the 2025 general election.

Turnout among new registrants

In the 2025 primary election, 59.6% of newly registered voters participated, double the rate of voters who had been registered for more than a year (29.1%). This marked a significant increase from 2021, when only 39.8% of newly registered voters participated. In both the 2021 and 2025 primary elections, new voters participated at higher rates than previously registered voters.

In the 2025 general election, newly registered voters participated at substantially higher rates than voters registered previously, reversing the trend observed in the 2021 general election where newly registered voters turned out at lower rates than those previously registered.

Figure 3.4: Voter turnout by length of voter registration, 2021 and 2025 general elections




In the 2025 general election, new voters turned out at a rate of 61.7%, compared with 40.6% among voters who had been registered for more than a year. This rate tripled compared with the 2021 election, when newly registered voters turned out at a rate of 18.5%. These patterns suggest that newly registered voters in 2025 were not only more numerous but also more engaged than newly registered voters in prior city general elections.

Analysis of new voters by age

The surge in new voter registrations in 2025 skewed younger than in previous city elections. Voters ages 18 to 29 accounted for nearly two thirds, or 64.8%, of all newly registered voters in 2025. This share increased from 55.3% in 2017 and 60.1% in 2021.

Figure 3.5: Share of newly registered voters by age group in 2025



Although newly registered voters came from all age groups, there was an expected, consistent downward trend in voter registration as age increased.


Turnout of new voters by age

Turnout among newly registered voters varied significantly by age in 2025. Newly registered voters under 40 participated at higher rates than older new voters in both the primary and general elections.

In focus: Newly registered voters



In the 2025 primary election, newly registered voters ages 18 to 29 turned out at the highest rate, followed by voters 30 to 39. This reversed trends from 2021, which saw voters ages 70 to 79 having the highest turnout rates.

Figure 3.6: Newly registered voter turnout by age group, primary elections, 2021 and 2025



These groups switched places in the general election, where newly registered voters ages 30 to 39 had the highest turnout, followed closely by those ages 18 to 29. This reversed trends from 2021, which saw voters ages 70 to 79 with the highest turnout rate.

Figure 3.7: Newly registered voter turnout by age group, general elections, 2021 and 2025



While younger new voters are typically the primary drivers of voter registration growth, in 2025 they were also the most engaged participants in the election.

Why did new voter registration increase in 2025?

The 2025 city election cycle was a departure from recent municipal election patterns, driven primarily by unusually high engagement among newly registered and younger voters. Demographic change alone does not explain the surge in participation among younger voters. Census estimates indicate that New York City’s median age has remained around 38 in recent years, suggesting the overall age distribution has remained relatively stable rather than shifting substantially toward younger residents.⁵⁶

While multiple factors likely contributed to increased participation, several factors suggest that candidate-driven mobilization might have played a meaningful role.⁵⁷ The unique surge in new voter registrations in 2025 coincided with a mayoral race that was widely publicized. Coverage widely portrayed the election as unusually engaging younger residents.⁵⁸ Reporting on the mayoral race highlighted that several campaigns, such as Mamdani’s mayoral campaign, made increased efforts to reach and mobilize younger voters on social media and other digital platforms.⁵⁹ This included publicizing registration deadlines, answering frequently asked voting administration questions in social media posts, and encouraging New York City residents registered in other states to update their registration to reflect their New York City residence.⁶⁰ The Mamdani campaign also used these platforms to increase issue resonance for the campaign.⁶¹

56 Census Reporter. “[New York, NY Profile](#).”; United States Census Bureau. “[County Population Totals and Components of Change: 2020–2025](#).” Mar 2026.

57 Additionally, newly registered voters’ party affiliation largely mirrored the overall electorate in 2025 and was consistent with patterns observed in 2021. Their borough distribution was also similar to the previous city election cycle.

58 Medina, Alberto, Sara Suzuki, and Ruby Belle Booth. “[Young Voters Power Mamdani Victory, Shape Key 2025 Elections](#).” The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, Tufts University. 5 Nov 2025.

59 Wells, Dylan. “[How Zohran Mamdani Used Social Media and Digital Culture to Reach Young Voters in New York City](#).” *The Washington Post*. 26 Jun 2025.; Stewart, Dodai. “[How Social Media Videos Fueled Zohran Mamdani’s Success](#).” *The New York Times*. 29 Jun 2025.

60 Kelly, Makena. “[Zohran Mamdani’s Campaign Figured Out How to Channel Fandom and Digital Engagement](#).” *Wired*. 5 Nov 2025.; Bergin, Brigid, and Joe Hong. “[How Newly Registered NYC Voters are Helping Fuel Zohran Mamdani’s Campaign](#).” 2 Oct 2025.

61 Smyton, Robin. “[What Mamdani’s Victory Says About Engaging Gen Z Voters](#).” *Newswise*. 5 Nov 2025.

Media reporting linked Mamdani’s issue-based messaging and outreach efforts with his success in exit polls and post-election analyses.⁶² These analyses highlight how Mamdani performed particularly well among first-time and younger voters (78.0% of voters under 30 and 66.0% of those ages 30–44 reported voting for him in exit polls).⁶³ Research on voter behavior supports the idea that candidate visibility and key issues resonating with voters can increase political engagement among younger voters in particular.⁶⁴ Ultimately, these factors do not prove that any single campaign caused the increase in new registrations in 2025. However, the convergence of a particularly young pool of new registrants with a campaigning environment that prioritized youth-focused outreach suggests that candidate-driven mobilization contributed to heightened registration activity in the 2025 election.

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- 62 Medina, Alberto, Sara Suzuki, and Ruby Belle Booth. “[Young Voters Power Mamdani Victory, Shape Key 2025 Elections.](#)” The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, Tufts University. 5 Nov 2025.; Fitzsimmons, Emma, Jeffery C. Mays, and Nicholas Fandos. “[Takeaways From the NYC Mayoral Election and Zohran Mamdani’s Stunning Win.](#)” *The New York Times*. 5 Nov 2025.
- 63 Forrester, Megan. “[Mamdani Clinches Support from Young and First-Time Voters in New York City Mayoral Race, Exit Polls Show.](#)” *ABC News*. 5 Nov 2025.; Sanders, Linley, Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, and Hyojin Yoo. “[How Key Demographic Groups Voted in 2025, According to the AP Voter Poll.](#)” *AP News*. 5 Nov 2025.
- 64 Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. “[Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States.](#)” *Princeton University Press*. 2014.

In focus: Ranked choice voting

Key points

- ▶ The 2025 election cycle represented the third time New Yorkers used ranked choice voting in a primary election and the second time it was used for citywide races since it was first introduced. Ranked choice voting allows voters to rank up to five candidates in order of their preference, instead of casting their vote for one single candidate.
- ▶ The June 2025 primaries saw a decrease in the share of voters who ranked more than one candidate on their ballot, from 88.3% in 2021 to 79.0% in 2025.
- ▶ In the 2025 Democratic primary election, 0.9% of ballots contained fatal overvote errors (ranking errors that invalidate the ballot), a slight decrease from 1.2% in 2021.
- ▶ In the 2025 Democratic primary, nearly half of voters (47.9%) who cast a vote for mayor used all five of their ranking slots. The most common five-rank sequence accounted for 14.2% of all valid Democratic ballots with a mayoral vote, a stark contrast from 2021, in which the most common ranking sequence accounted for only 0.1% of valid Democratic ballots with a mayoral vote.
- ▶ The 2025 election cycle saw a threefold increase in consistent single-rankers across all offices. In 2025, 18.0% of voters ranked a single candidate in every eligible race, compared with 5.5% in 2021.

Ranked choice voting (RCV) allows voters to rank their candidates in order of preference. First, all first-choice votes are tallied; if a candidate receives more than 50.0% of those votes, that candidate wins outright. However, if no candidate surpasses the 50.0% threshold, the vote counting proceeds to additional rounds that consider voters' second through fifth choices. In each round, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and ballots cast for that candidate are redistributed to each voter's next highest-ranked candidate. This process

continues until only two candidates remain, at which point the candidate with the highest vote total wins the election.⁶⁵

In June 2025, New York City voters selected candidates to represent their parties in the November general election. The June primaries included RCV races for mayor, public advocate, comptroller, and 30 of the 51 city council districts.⁶⁶ This marked the third use of RCV in primary elections, following its implementation in 2021 and its use in 2023.⁶⁷

Figure 3.8: Primary election RCV races on the ballot by political party

| Party | Mayor | Public Advocate | Comptroller | Borough President | City Council | Total RCV races |
|-------------|-------|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Democratic | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 28 | 34 |
| Republican* | n/a | n/a | 1 | n/a | 3 | 4 |
| All | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 31 | 38 |

* Republican primaries were not held for the offices of mayor, public advocate, and borough president.

In the June 2025 Democratic primary, Zohran Mamdani secured the party’s mayoral nomination for the general election. The race unfolded after then-Mayor Eric Adams, who had initially announced he would seek re-election as a Democrat, announced in April that he would instead run as an independent and skip the Democratic primary.⁶⁸

65 NYC Votes. [“Ranked Choice Voting.”](#)

66 While all 51 city council districts were up for reelection in 2025, some races did not have primary challengers and therefore were not on the primary ballot.

67 In 2021, RCV was used in the June primary, which included the offices of mayor, public advocate, comptroller, borough presidents, and city council. RCV was used again in the 2023 June primary for city council races.

68 Fitzsimmons, Emma. [“Eric Adams to Run as an Independent, Skipping Democratic Primary.”](#) *The New York Times*. 4 Apr 2025.; Goldenberg, Sally. [“Adams to Skip New York City’s Democratic Primary, Run for Re-election on Nonpartisan Line.”](#) *POLITICO*. 3 Apr 2025.

In focus: Ranked choice voting

In the first round of voting, Mamdani received 43.8% of the vote, compared with Andrew Cuomo's 36.1% and Brad Lander's 11.3%. After eleven rounds of tabulation, Mamdani won the nomination with 56.4% of the final vote, while Cuomo received 43.6%. In the final elimination round, a substantial share of Lander's supporters' second-choice votes went to Mamdani, pushing him past the 50.0% threshold.⁶⁹ More details about the [impact of endorsements](#) can be found later in this section.

Notably, 15.3% of valid ballots in the Democratic primary only voted for Cuomo. As a result, the most common ballot sequence was Cuomo voted first choice, followed by four blank rankings. Following his primary loss, Cuomo opted to run in the general election as an independent candidate.

The Republican party did not hold a primary for mayor, with RCV used for the Republican candidates for three city council races and comptroller only.

How did New Yorkers use ranked choice voting in 2025?

2025 saw the highest number of new voters using RCV since it was first introduced in 2021. Higher turnout in 2025 also means that a broader population of the electorate is using RCV compared to previous years.


Data from the New York City Board of Elections allows the CFB to conduct in-depth analysis on voter preferences and behaviors, especially when it comes to RCV.⁷⁰ The results show that in the 2025 primaries, 79.0% of voters ranked more than one candidate.⁷¹

69 Hutchinson, Rachel, Bryan Huang, and Deb Otis. "[New York City Cast Vote Record: An Initial Analysis of the 2025 Democratic Mayoral Primary.](#)" FairVote. 24 Jul 2025.

70 The New York City Board of Elections released the 2025 Cast Vote Record (CVR) on July 24, 2025. The CVR is an anonymized digital dataset of each ballot cast in an election. In 2025, it included information from the ranked choice voting election, including how each ballot ranked candidates. The CVR is publicly available on the New York City Board of Elections website: "[Election Results Summary.](#)"

71 80.0% of Democrats and 47.3% of Republicans.

Figure 3.9: Percent of voters who ranked more than one candidate in RCV primary elections, 2021 and 2025



While this shows the vast majority of voters are still selecting multiple candidates, it is a decline from 2021, when 88.3% of voters overall ranked more than one candidate.⁷² 47.9% of voters used all five of their ranking slots.⁷³

Voters also demonstrated selective engagements across contests, choosing to focus on certain races while not voting in others, though at lower rates than in 2021. In the 2025 primary, 18.0% of all ballots skipped at least one race, compared with 20.3% in 2021.

Across all offices, 2025 also saw a threefold increase in consistent single-rankers—voters who ranked only one candidate in every RCV contest on their ballot. In total, 18.0% of voters ranked a single candidate in every eligible race, compared with just 5.5% in 2021.⁷⁴

⁷² 89.3% of Democrats and 56.6% of Republicans.

⁷³ These possible combinations include 11 candidates, one write-in option, and the option to leave a rank blank. In 2021, when 13 candidates competed in the Democratic primary's mayoral race, 46.2% of Democrats used all five of their ranks.


⁷⁴ The pattern differed by party affiliation: 16.8% of Democrats were consistent single rankers in 2025, compared with 5.2% in 2021. Among Republicans, 50.5% did the same in 2025—a sharp rise from 10.1% in 2021.

Single candidate voters in the Democratic primary election for mayor

In the Democratic primary election for mayor, 22.1% of voters selected only one candidate in 2025, compared with 13.0% in 2021.

Among these single-choice voters in 2025, 74.8% selected Cuomo as their sole choice—the most frequent sequence among ballots in the Democratic primary race for mayor, appearing on 15.3% of all valid ballots.


Figure 3.10: Single-candidate voters in the mayoral Democratic primary race, 2025



The relatively high proportion of voters who voted for Cuomo and no other candidates is consistent with Cuomo actively not endorsing any other candidates.

By comparison, in 2021, single-choice Democratic primary voters accounted for 13.0% of voters in the mayoral race, and the most common ranking sequence—representing 6.3% of valid ballots in the Democratic primary race for mayor—was a vote for Eric Adams, followed by four blank rankings.

Figure 3.11: Single candidate voters in the mayoral Democratic primary race, 2021



2025 saw more voters coalescing around the same single-choice candidate compared to 2021.

Measuring the use of ranked choice voting

In 2021, the CFB created its own metric to measure the use of ranked choice voting by voters, called a ranking score. A ranking score is the ratio of unique ranks a voter used out of the total number of possible ranks in the race; the higher the score, out of a total of 100, the more the voter used RCV in that race.

Figure 3.12: Average ranking score by office on the ballot, by party primary

| | Democratic | Republican | All parties |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Mayor | 70.2 | n/a | n/a |
| Public Advocate | 42.4 | n/a | n/a |
| Comptroller | 41.0 | 51.0 | 41.3 |
| Borough President | 45.1 | n/a | n/a |
| Council (2 candidates + write-in) | 44.6 | 43.9 | 44.6 |
| Council (3+ candidates) | 45.9 | 43.4 | 45.9 |
| Overall ballot | 51.9 | 50.8 | 51.8 |

In the 2025 primaries, the citywide average ranking score was 51.8, meaning the average New York City voter used slightly more than half of the rankings available on their ballot.⁷⁵

Comparatively, the average ranking score in 2021 was 52.0, which means the rate of RCV use remained similar in the recent election.⁷⁶ Overall, 0.8% of all eligible voters selected candidates for every possible ranking across city offices and therefore had a perfect

75 Ranking scores are determined by looking at the number of unique ranks a voter used in the race compared to the total number of possible ranks in the race. For a voter to have a perfect ranking score, they must have made a selection for every possible rank across all city offices they were eligible to vote in. For example, in the 2025 Democratic primary for mayor, the ballot allows voters to rank up to five candidates. A voter earns a score of 100 for the mayoral race if they rank five unique candidates. To calculate the overall mayoral average, we average the ranking scores from the mayoral race across all Democratic voters.

76 For citywide races, Democrats averaged a ranking score of 51.9, while Republicans recorded an average of 50.8, indicating a very small difference between the two parties. In 2021, Democrats’ citywide average ranking score was 52.3, while Republicans’ average was 45.9.

overall ranking score.⁷⁷ Ranking score varied significantly by office. Higher ranking scores could indicate higher familiarity with the race and its candidates; the mayor’s race in the Democratic primary had the highest ranking score of all offices on the ballot. Republican voters used RCV at higher rates than Democrats for the comptroller primary, with it being the only citywide office on the Republican primary ballot.

New Yorkers’ understanding of ranked choice voting

Although New Yorkers previously voted using RCV in the 2021 and 2023 election cycles, it remains a relatively new voting system. A key metric for the CFB is voter familiarity with RCV—specifically, the extent to which voters understand how the system works and how to use the additional ranking options it provides.

The CFB measures this by examining the rate of fatal overvotes, which occur when a voter ranks more than one candidate as their first preference, making it impossible to determine a voter’s choice in a particular race and automatically invalidating their vote for that race. A higher fatal overvote rate can indicate greater misunderstanding of how to vote using RCV.

In the June 2025 primary election, the fatal overvote rate declined slightly compared to 2021. This year, 0.9% of ballots contained a fatal overvote error. While this is down from 1.2% in the 2021 primaries, it is higher than the median fatal overvote rate in all single-winner RCV elections in the U.S of 0.2%.⁷⁸

Similarly, 1.5% of voters cast an undervote in the first rank, meaning they left the first rank blank in at least one race on their ballot; this represents a slight decrease from 1.9% in 2021. Overvotes in ranks other than the first also declined, with 0.9% of ballots reflecting that error in at least one contest, a slight decrease from 1.4% in 2021. Though these are relatively minor decreases, they may indicate increased voter familiarity with the ranked choice ballot and a clearer understanding of how to rank correctly. These improvements in error rates are particularly noteworthy given the high rate of new voters in 2025, with many voters using RCV for the first time.


77 This is a slight decrease from 2021, when 0.82% of all eligible voters achieved a perfect overall ranking score. This decrease is largely due to an observed decrease among Democrats with perfect scores when separating by party affiliation. In 2021, 0.64% of Democrats and 3.7% of Republicans had a perfect score, and in 2025, these numbers were of 0.60% and 5.1% respectively.

78 FairVote. “[Research and Data on RCV in Practice.](#)” 2025.

In focus: Ranked choice voting

In 2025, 23 of the city's 51 council districts had fatal overvote rates that surpassed the citywide average rate.⁷⁹ By comparison, in 2021, 28 districts recorded rates above the citywide average.⁸⁰

Figure 3.13: Percentage of fatal overvotes by city council district, primary election



79 The top three Council districts with the highest fatal overvote error rates in any race in 2025 were Council District 14 (Bronx) at 1.9%, followed by Council District 21 (Queens) and Council District 8 (Bronx and Manhattan), each at 1.6%.

80 In 2025, 45.1% of Council districts fell below the citywide fatal overvote rate, while in 2021, the rate was 54.9%. The top three Council districts with the most fatal overvote errors in any race were Council District 14 (Bronx) at 1.9%, and Council District 21 (Queens) and Council District 8 (Bronx and Manhattan), both at 1.6%.

As a share of all city council districts, 45.1% recorded higher fatal overvote rates than the citywide rate in 2025, compared with 54.9% in 2021. Together, these figures suggest a more balanced distribution of fatal overvote rates across council districts in 2025 compared with 2021, with fewer districts reporting comparatively high fatal overvote rates.

RCV Mailer Experiment

Prior to the June 2025 RCV primary election, the CFB conducted a targeted mailing campaign experiment. The CFB launched this initiative in response to high fatal overvote rates observed in the 2021 primary election.


The CFB sent a long mailer providing a detailed explanation on steps to fill an RCV ballot to a treatment group of registered voters in the ten council districts with the highest fatal overvote rates in 2021 (five districts in the Bronx, two in Brooklyn, two in Queens, and one that covers parts of both the Bronx and Manhattan). The control group of registered voters in the remaining 41 council districts received a shorter mailer, offering only basic RCV ballot instructions.

The experiment found that city council districts in the treatment group had a larger raw number drop in fatal overvote rates than those in the control group.⁸¹ However, once accounting for the treatment group's higher starting rates in 2021, there was no significant evidence that the longer mailer caused additional improvement.

The map below illustrates changes in fatal overvote rates across city council districts between 2021 and 2025, with districts that received longer mailers outlined in orange. Districts where fatal overvote rates increased are in red, while districts where they decreased are in blue. Following the mailer experiment, all but two city council districts, Council District 4 (Manhattan) and Council District 46 (Brooklyn), recorded an improvement in fatal overvote rates.

81 The treatment mean fatal overvote rate fell 1.3 percentage points, from 2.6% to 1.3%. The control group saw a smaller decrease of 0.27 percentage points.

Figure 3.14: Change in percentage of fatal overvotes by city council district, primary elections, 2021 and 2025




Endorsements

Beyond traditional campaign endorsements, RCV elections create opportunities for cross-endorsements among candidates appearing on the same ballot. Candidates took advantage of this opportunity to varying degrees leading up to the 2025 primaries.

Mayoral candidate Cuomo did not endorse any other candidates. Notably, as mentioned above, a single first-rank vote for Cuomo followed by blank rankings was the most common ballot pattern in the Democratic primary mayoral race. On the other hand, Mamdani and Lander publicly endorsed one another for the first and second positions on the ballot.⁸² This alignment may have had a meaningful effect on the outcomes; in the eleventh and final round of RCV elimination, three quarters (75.0%) of voters who ranked Lander first had ranked Mamdani second, a pattern that ultimately proved decisive in the primary results.⁸³

Figure 3.15: Vote tabulation in the final round for mayor, with Lander votes redistributed



82 Ngo, Emily. “[Zohran Mamdani, Brad Lander are Cross-Endorsing in Race for New York City Mayor.](#)” *POLITICO*. 13 Jun 2025.

83 Hutchinson, Rachel, Bryan Huang, and Deb Otis. “[New York City Cast Vote Record: An Initial Analysis of the 2025 Democratic Mayoral Primary.](#)” FairVote. 24 Jul 2025.

In focus: Ranked choice voting

The 2025 cycle also reflected more visible strategic use of RCV. Coordination against candidates and slate endorsements may have played a significant role in shaping ballot patterns. For example, UAW Region 9A launched the DREAM movement—“Don’t Rank Eric or Andrew for Mayor (DREAM)” —prior to Eric Adams’ decision not to participate in the Democratic primary.⁸⁴ The Working Families Party (WFP) endorsed a five-candidate slate and encouraged supporters to rank all five in an effort to consolidate support against Cuomo. In May 2025, the WFP endorsed Mamdani, Lander, Adrienne Adams, Zellnor Myrie, and Jessica Ramos as its recommended five-rank slate, in this order.⁸⁵ After Ramos endorsed Cuomo in June, the WFP withdrew its fifth-place endorsement without naming a replacement, though other groups added Michael Blake as a fifth-rank candidate.⁸⁶

Following those endorsements, the most common five-rank sequence that used all five ranks of the mayoral race in the Democratic primary was: Mamdani; Lander; Adrienne Adams; Myrie; Blake—which accounted for 14.2% of all valid Democratic ballots that used all five ranks for the mayoral race. By comparison, the most common ranking sequence in 2021 represented only 0.1% of valid Democratic ballots with a mayoral vote.⁸⁷ While multiple factors may have influenced these voting patterns, the increase in concentration around a specific ranking sequence is substantial.

Given that voters had a total of 371,293 possible unique ranking combination in the mayoral Democratic primary race, the prevalence of coordinated ranking patterns suggests that organizations, labor unions, elected officials, candidates, and voters are increasingly engaging with RCV in strategic ways, and that voters are amenable to following ranking endorsements from sources they trust.

84 McDonough, Annie. “[DREAM: A New Motto for Anti-Adams, Anti-Cuomo Voters.](#)” *City & State*. 28 Feb 2025.; Mancilla, Brandon, and Jane Fox. “[UAW Says It’s Our Time to D.R.E.A.M.: Don’t Rank Eric \(Adams\) or Andrew \(Cuomo\) for Mayor.](#)” *UAW Region 9A*. 29 Feb 2025.

85 Working Families Party. “[NYWFP Ranks Zohran Mamdani #1 for NYC Mayor.](#)” 30 May 2025.

86 McDonough, Annie. “[Progressives Pull Ramos Endorsements After She Backs Andrew Cuomo.](#)” *City & State*. 6 Jun 2025.

87 The ranking sequence was: Maya D. Wiley; Kathryn A. Garcia; Scott M. Stringer; Dianne Morales; and Shaun Donovan.

Overall, the third election cycle using RCV in New York City showed promising signs of increased voter and institutional familiarity with the system. According to exit polls, 96.0% of NYC Democratic primary voters reported that RCV ballots were simple to complete and three quarters of individuals polled said they supported keeping or expanding the RCV system. Exit polls also indicated that 81.0% of voters reported they understand RCV extremely or very well, 16.0% somewhat well, and only 3.0% not well.⁸⁸ Despite the decrease in primary election voters who ranked more than one mayoral candidate since the 2021 election cycle, the data and results show that voters engage with RCV, and candidates and interested stakeholders have been considering the RCV in their campaign strategies.

88 Mantell, Will. [“Exit Poll: 96% of NYC Voters Say Ranked Choice Voting is Simple, 76% Want to Keep or Expand It.”](#) FairVote. 1 Jul 2025.; Common Cause. [“Ranked Choice Voting Brought New Yorkers Together in This Year’s Democratic Primary.”](#) 1 Jul 2025.

Recom- mendations

Update on previous recommendations

Key points

- ▶ The CFB has made three key recommendations in past Voter Analysis Reports that this chapter will review.
- ▶ The CFB has successfully launched the pilot program of the Civic Engagement Fellowship in 2025.
- ▶ Governor Kathy Hochul signed legislation to allow New York State to join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC).
- ▶ In 2025, New Yorkers voted “No” on a ballot proposal to align local elections with presidential election years.

As mandated by the New York City Charter, each year, the Voter Analysis Report includes policy and program recommendations based on the CFB’s analysis of the previous election year. These recommendations are made with the purpose of “increasing voter registration and [...] participation.”⁸⁹ This section provides updates on three important policy recommendations the CFB has made in recent years:

1. Implement a Civic Engagement Fellowship Program
2. Join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC)
3. Align odd-year city elections with even-year state and federal elections

89 New York City Charter. [Chapter 46, § 1054](#).

Implement a Civic Engagement Fellowship Program

In the 2023 Voter Analysis Report, the CFB recommended implementing a Civic Engagement Fellowship pilot program.⁹⁰ This recommendation demonstrated intent to make a direct, long-term investment in the CFB’s priority communities while empowering young, emerging civic leaders and community based organizations (CBOs) who are committed to this work.

In partnership with the City University of New York’s Institute of State and Local Governance (CUNY ISLG), the CFB launched the Civic Engagement Fellowship pilot program in August 2025. The fellowship matched 14 CUNY undergraduate students with 14 Bronx-based CBOs to launch or expand civic engagement programming in their communities. Over the two years of this pilot, from August 2025 through August 2027, fellows will work with their host CBOs to engage their local community, develop civic engagement programs, and meet biweekly at CUNY ISLG to learn necessary skills. Partnering CBOs will receive training and technical assistance from CUNY ISLG to support their civic engagement work with their fellows. The CFB and CUNY ISLG websites include more information on the Civic Engagement Fellowship [launch](#) and [fellow participants](#).

Join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC)

In the 2024 Voter Analysis Report, the CFB recommended New York join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), a multi-state organization dedicated to cross-referencing voter data with federal and inter-state records. This recommendation was made due to the current decentralized system managed independently across the New York State’s 62 county election boards. The system often relies on paper-based processes that are prone to error, delays, and administrative inefficiencies.⁹¹

On December 12, 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul signed Senate Bill S1356A, authorizing the State Board of Elections to join ERIC immediately.⁹² The law requires that New York complete its registration and join the 25 other member states and the District of Columbia by July 31, 2026.⁹³

90 2023 Voter Analysis Report. “[Policy and Program Recommendations](#).”

91 2024 Voter Analysis Report. “[Policy and Legislative Recommendations](#).”

92 New York State Senate. S1356A (2025–2026): “[An act to amend the election law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to joining multistate voter list maintenance organizations](#).”

93 Electronic Registration Information Center. “[What is ERIC?](#)”

Align odd-year city elections with even-year federal elections

In the 2023 and 2024 Voter Analysis Report, the CFB recommended that New York align municipal elections with even-year federal elections to reduce voter fatigue, increase voter turnout, and make the city’s electorate more representative. Consolidating federal and local elections have also been shown to increase voter representation, particularly among younger voters and voters of color, and reduce the influence of special interests that typically have outsized power in low-turnout elections.⁹⁴

The 2025 Charter Revision Commission appointed by former Mayor Eric Adams included the measure as one of their five ballot proposals for the November general election. As mentioned in the [By the numbers: On the ballot](#) section, Ballot Proposal 6 to “Move Local Elections to Presidential Election Years to Increase Voter Participation” was rejected by 52.8% of voters, while 47.2% voted in favor.⁹⁵ Supporters of the measure agreed that moving local elections to even years would allow more New Yorkers to have a say in the city’s leadership and save millions of dollars by reducing the number of elections overall. They cited the discrepancy between presidential election turnout (60% in 2020) versus local election turnout (23% in 2021). Opponents of the proposal expressed concern that local races would receive less voter attention at the bottom of the ticket.⁹⁶ High-profile public figures, including now-Mayor Mamdani, voiced their opposition to the measure on election day.⁹⁷

Despite its defeat in 2025, this measure could return to the ballot through several channels, including a new charter revision commission, city council legislation, or state legislative action. Each of these paths would require approval from voters through a future ballot proposal.

94 2023 Voter Analysis Report. [“Policy and Program Recommendations.”](#)

95 New York City Board of Elections. [“Statement and Return Report for Certification: General Election 2025 - 11/04/2025.”](#) 2 Dec 2025.

96 NYC Votes. [“Ballot Proposal 6.”](#)

97 Kost, Ryan. [“Mamdani Says He’s Voting for Housing Ballot Proposals, Against Even-Year Election Measure.”](#) *Gothamist*. 4 Nov 2025.

Recommendation to align registration dates

Key points

- ▶ New York has a change of party enrollment deadline that is more than four months before its primary election date.
- ▶ This policy limits the number of voters eligible to participate in primary elections.
- ▶ Young voters, who are more likely to be registered with minor political parties or no political party, are disproportionately impacted by this policy.
- ▶ Aligning the party enrollment deadline with the regular voter registration deadline would enable more voters to participate in primary elections.

New York is one of ten states with closed primaries, meaning voters must be registered with a political party to vote in that party's primary. New York's party enrollment deadline is February 14, more than four months before the June primary, requiring voters to make enrollment decisions long before candidates or party primaries are even confirmed. These two policies taken together create one of the most restrictive primary systems in the country. This chapter examines how these policies came to be, how they shaped voter participation in 2025, and how the state can improve access to primary elections by moving the party enrollment deadline closer to the election.

Background and context

New York voters must be aware of multiple deadlines, which vary depending on whether a voter is registering for the first time or is looking to update their current registration. There are three major registration deadlines that serve different purposes, outlined in the chart below.

Figure 4.1: New York State voter registration deadlines

| Registration deadline | Timing in law | Description |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| Change of party enrollment | Fixed to February 14 ⁹⁸ | Deadline for already-registered voters to change their party enrollment. |
| Change of address | 15 days before election day ⁹⁹ | Deadline for already-registered voters to update their personal information, such as their name and/or address. |
| Voter registration | 10 days before election day ¹⁰⁰ | Deadline for new registrants to register as voters in New York City. (It falls on the first day of in-person early voting.) |

Registration deadlines serve an administrative purpose—they allow election officials time to determine eligibility and finalize registration lists, reducing the risk of last-minute disputes, errors, and distribution of provisional ballots at poll sites. Election officials also use registration lists to assign voters to poll sites, though this need has diminished with modern tools such as electronic pollbooks (adopted statewide in 2019) and online voter registration (available to all voters since 2023).¹⁰¹

The change of enrollment deadline dates to the early 20th century, when direct primary elections replaced the convention system in which party leaders selected candidates. Beyond its administrative function, the deadline was designed to prevent “party raiding,” a tactic in which voters temporarily switch parties to influence a primary, then switch back to their true party of choice. While this concern has occasionally surfaced in New York City

98 This deadline was last changed in 2019, when it was brought from October of the prior year to February 14, in time for the 2020 presidential primary election.

99 New York State Election Law § [5-210](#).

100 New York State. “[Governor Hochul Signs Legislation Expanding Time for Voter Registration](#).” 23 Dec 2022.

101 Myrie, Zellnor. “[Senate Passes Legislation to Allow Electronic Pollbooks, Bringing New York’s Election System to the Modern Era](#).” The New York State Senate. 27 Feb 2019.; New York State Board of Elections. “[New York State Board of Elections Launches Online Voter Registration Portal](#).” 31 May 2023.

politics, the city’s overwhelmingly Democratic electorate makes this tactic a limited concern in practice.¹⁰²

The combination of closed primaries and a party enrollment change date 129 days before the primary is uncommon across the United States. There are only nine other states with closed primaries and seven other states with a party affiliation deadline more than two months ahead of a primary election.¹⁰³ Only three other states have the combination of both factors—Kentucky, Delaware, and Wyoming.

Figure 4.2: States with closed primaries and/or early party enrollment deadlines

| State | Primary election type | Number of days between party enrollment change date and primary election day |
|---------------|-----------------------|--|
| Kentucky | Closed | 139 days |
| New York | Closed | 129 days |
| Delaware | Closed | 108 days |
| Wyoming | Closed | 97 days |
| New Hampshire | Open to unaffiliated | 97 days |
| Idaho | Partially closed | 88 days |
| Utah | Partially closed | 83 days |

102 Clifford, Michel and Ann Choi. “[Upstarts Press 1.6 million NYC Voters to Switch to Democratic Party to Sway Mayoral Primary.](#)” *THE CITY*. 21 Jan 2021.; New Yorkers United for Change. “[Operation ‘Primary Switch.’](#)” 2021.; Barkan, Ross. “[NY’s Party Enrollment Deadline Saga Somehow Just Got More Confusing.](#)” *Gothamist*. 31 May 2019.

103 National Conference of State Legislatures. “[State Primary Election Types.](#)” 25 Feb 2026.; National Conference of State Legislatures. “[Voter Party Affiliation Deadlines for Primaries.](#)” 20 Jan 2026.

Recommendation to align registration dates

| State | Primary election type | Number of days between party enrollment change date and primary election day |
|--------------|-----------------------|--|
| Oklahoma | Partially closed | 76 days |
| New Jersey | Closed | 50 days |
| Florida | Closed | 29 days |
| New Mexico | Closed | 28 days |
| Pennsylvania | Closed | 15 days |
| Nevada | Closed | 5 days |
| Tennessee | Closed ¹⁰⁴ | No registration deadline ¹⁰⁵ |

Furthermore, Kentucky is the only state that has a party registration deadline further away from the primary election date than New York (139 days, or more than four and a half months).

The CFB has documented registration barriers across multiple Voter Analysis Reports (VARs). The 2021 VAR called for consolidating all registration deadlines into a single date; the 2024 VAR flagged voter fatigue and erratic primary scheduling as systemic problems.¹⁰⁶ The 2024 VAR also highlighted research showing that young voters bear the greatest burden—they move more frequently and have fewer interactions with the government

104 Tennessee is legally considered a closed primary state, because it requires voters to be “bona fide members” of a political party. However, it functions more like a partially closed system, since there is no party registration deadline and voters only need to “declare allegiance” to a political party to vote in that party’s primary.

105 At the time the voter seeks to vote, the voter can “declare allegiance” to a given political party in order to affiliate with that party and vote in its primary election.

106 2021 Voter Analysis Report. “[Policy and Legislative Recommendations.](#)”; 2024 Voter Analysis Report. “[Policy and Legislative Recommendations.](#)”

agencies that typically prompt voter registration. Taken together, these findings underline a consistent theme in the elections space: New York’s registration rules tend to serve institutional actors, such as party leaders or elected officials, more than regular voters. Past VARs have not specifically addressed the party enrollment deadline’s general impact on voters.

Young voters, who are more likely to be registered with minor political parties or no political party (unaffiliated), are disproportionately impacted by the length of time between the change of enrollment deadline and the primary election. As explained in the [By the numbers: Voter registration](#) chapter, in 2025, 20.6% of all registered voters were not affiliated with a political party. Nearly a quarter (24.6%) of those unaffiliated voters were under 30, and nearly half (48.4%) of unaffiliated voters were under 40.

Change of party enrollment deadline impact on voters

The enrollment deadline’s effect on voter participation was especially apparent in 2025, when a competitive Democratic mayoral primary generated unusually high press and public interest in the early months of the year.¹⁰⁷ The February 14 deadline required voters to commit to a party more than four months before the election, before the April petition deadline, before debates, and before it was even known which parties would hold primaries or which candidates would appear on the ballot.

Around February 14, roughly 3,900 party enrollment change forms were submitted in a three-day window — a small fraction of the approximately 1.2 million voters registered without major-party affiliation who were eligible to use the deadline. The data alone cannot tell us whether this low figure reflects limited voter interest in changing enrollment or limited awareness of the deadline itself; either explanation, or some combination, is consistent with the number.

What the deadline structure does illustrate, independent of the data, is an asymmetry in how New York election law treats voters based on whether they are registering for the first time or changing their registration. A first-time registrant could decide to participate in the mayoral primary as late as ten days before election day, while an already-registered voter without major-party affiliation had to make that same decision 129 days in advance.

107 Barron, James. [“Today is a Deadline for N.Y.C. Voters Who Want to Support Eric Adams’s Challengers.”](#) *The New York Times*. 14 Feb 2025.; Bergen, Brigid. [“If You Want to Switch Parties for a NYC primary, Re-register by Valentine’s Day.”](#) *Gothamist*. 10 Feb 2025.; Rahhal, Emily. [“It’s the Last Week to Change Party Affiliation Ahead of NYC Mayor’s Race.”](#) *Pix 11*. 11 Feb 2025.

Recommendation to align registration dates

The 2025 primary made clear that many voters do not understand the party enrollment requirement and that the consequences of their confusion were real. The CFB fields thousands of inquiries through its NYC Votes email and social media channels; leading up to the June election, the agency received a significant volume of reports from voters and stakeholders, summarized below.

- Poll worker reports of numerous occasions where voters assumed they could vote across party lines (e.g., WFP voters wanting to vote in the Democratic primary)
- Voter complaints about having to change party registration “five months before the election” when “many voters may not have heard of the candidates who were running at that point.”
- Voter who had “voted for a party their entire life” but not realizing they were unaffiliated and thus not able to vote in the primary.
- Voters who were confused about the concept of party registration and unsure if they are allowed to vote for candidates in other parties at the general election.
- Voters requesting to change parties via affidavit ballots.

These experiences were echoed at the July 2025 Voter Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC) post-primary hearing, where multiple community partners testified about voter confusion over registration deadlines and primary eligibility.¹⁰⁸ Many voters learned for the first time at the poll site that they were unable to vote because of their party registration.

108 NYC Votes and NYC Campaign Finance Board. “[July 2025 Voter Assistance Advisory Committee Hearing.](#)” *YouTube*. 9 Jul 2025.

Recommendation: Align the party enrollment deadline and the change of name and/or address deadline with the last day to register to vote

New York State has some of the most restrictive voter registration and primary election policies in the country. To allow more voters to participate in primary elections, the state legislature should amend the election law to move the party enrollment deadline to ten days before an election, to line up with the voter registration deadline.

While doing this, the state legislature should also amend the election law to move the change of name and/or address deadline to this same day.

This would address the asymmetry in how New York election law treats those who seek to register versus those who seek to make changes to their registration. Under this change, already-registered voters would have the same window to choose their party enrollment and correctly record their name and/or address ahead of the mayoral primary as first-time registrants.

This would also center voter experience and reduce the number of different deadlines voters need to keep track of, streamlining registration dates as first recommended in our [2021 Voter Analysis Report](#). It would mean that the deadlines for first-time registrants and already-registered voters seeking to update their details would all fall on the same day, coinciding with the first day of early voting. As evidenced throughout this chapter, in 2025, many voters were caught unaware of their party affiliation and unable to participate in the primary election they wanted to vote in. Aligning the party enrollment deadline, change of name and/or address deadline, and the voter registration deadline would not eliminate all barriers, but it would ensure that voters have the same window to make enrollment decisions as they do to register for the first time. This is a straightforward change that expands access without compromising election administration.

The CFB's vision is one where every New Yorker is empowered to participate meaningfully in elections. In this light, voter deadlines should prioritize voter experience and encourage voter participation in our electoral system. In 2025, it was clear that the party enrollment deadline restricted democratic participation for many voters. Analysis of voter registration patterns and policies prove there is more work to be done to bring this vision to life.

Recommendations to strengthen CFB governance

Key points

- ▶ The CFB's Voter Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC) is no longer fully functional: it has had no chair since May 2023 and no appointed members since December 2024. Even before then, its issues have been long-standing. In its absence, the CFB has undertaken the VAAC's responsibilities in the city charter.
- ▶ Consolidating the VAAC into a reformed and expanded Board would update the CFB's governance structure to reflect this additional voter engagement work the Board is already undertaking.
- ▶ Expanding the Board and updating its structure would also provide an opportunity to broaden racial, gender, and borough diversity, an important goal that the Board supports.

2025 has shown that New York City voters are highly engaged and want to participate in their city's democracy. Despite this, the Voter Assistance Advisory Committee (VAAC), the nine-member body that advises the CFB on voter engagement, has become dysfunctional. It has had no chair since May 2023, no appointed members since December 2024, and has never had the appropriate authority as a body. In its absence and as a result of long-standing issues, the Board has largely absorbed this voter engagement work, creating the necessary support and staffing within the agency for effective NYC voter engagement.

While the Board's commitment has ensured the important work of voter engagement has continued, it also means that the CFB's formal governance structure does not reflect how it is currently operating. This chapter presents three recommendations to bring the Board's structure into better alignment with its operations:

- Recommendation 1: Integrate VAAC responsibilities into the Board
- Recommendation 2: Expand Board to seven members
- Recommendation 3: Align compensation with peer boards

Unifying the Board and VAAC would modernize and streamline the agency's governance model, improve accountability to the public, and create a more cohesive leadership structure across campaign finance administration and voter engagement. Expanding the Board as part of this unification would also provide an opportunity to broaden the Board's racial, gender, and borough diversity, an important goal that the Board supports.

CFB and VAAC history and governance context

The New York City Charter lays out the structure of the CFB in § 1052. The CFB was created after a series of corruption scandals and reform efforts in the mid-1980s led the city council to enact the New York City Campaign Finance Act in 1988, which Mayor Ed Koch signed into law and voters later ratified through charter revisions establishing the Board as a charter agency. It was created to serve as an independent, nonpartisan agency responsible for administering the city's campaign finance system as outlined in the charter and the Campaign Finance Act.

The New York City Charter lays out the structure of the VAAC in § 1054. The Voter Assistance Commission (VAC) was created in 1988 to provide a role for government to assist in increasing voter registration and participation. The VAAC was created in 2010 when the VAC was restructured and moved into the CFB in an advisory role.¹⁰⁹

Over time, several legislative changes have grown the CFB's role in the democracy space. The city council has steadily expanded the agency's voter registration work through local laws; these new initiatives require significant resources and expertise and are primarily managed by CFB staff. Local Law 29 of 2000 required designated city agencies to offer voter registration forms; while early implementation was guided by the VAC, responsibility for administering agency-based voter registration was formalized under the CFB with the creation of the VAAC in 2010, with all operational work carried out by agency staff.¹¹⁰ The scope of agency-based voter registration further expanded in 2014, increasing the number of participating agencies.¹¹¹

Over the last decade, the Council has also significantly broadened the CFB's voter education mandate. In 2016, law changes required the CFB to produce Voter Guides for state and federal elections in addition to city races.¹¹² Subsequent legislation expanded the content of

109 New York City Charter Revision Commission. "[Final Report of the 2010 New York City Charter Revision Commission](#)." 23 Aug 2010.

110 Local Law 29 of 2000.

111 Local Law 63 of 2014.; New York City Charter §[1057\(a\)](#).

112 Local Law 170 of 2016.; New York City Charter §[1052\(b\)\(2\)](#).

those guides to include individualized voter history information and, in 2022, required both print and online Voter Guides to be published in English and the city’s top ten languages other than English, with the online Voter Guide required to include video statements from candidates made available with captioning and American Sign Language translation.¹¹³ In 2019, the agency was also tasked with conducting a citywide voter education campaign on ranked choice voting.¹¹⁴ Collectively, these changes reflect the substantial growth of the CFB’s democracy work, which has been — and continues to be — designed, implemented, and led by CFB staff. The VAAC’s role is indirect as reflected in the law and in practice.

Board composition and responsibilities

The Board’s governance structure was intentionally designed to prevent enforcement decisions from being influenced by politics while maintaining accountability and transparent audit and enforcement processes. Over the course of its history, the Board has had many distinguished members, including its founding Chair, Father Joseph A. O’Hare, and future Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor. However, the Board has often not reflected the diversity of New York City’s residents and has generally not had more than two people of color and/or women serving on the Board.

The Board consists of five members: two members appointed by the mayor, two appointed by the speaker of the city council, and the chairperson appointed by the mayor after consultation with the speaker.¹¹⁵ For the mayor’s two regular appointees, no more than one may belong to the same political party. The same rule applies to the speaker’s two appointees. The mayor’s appointment of the chairperson is not subject to a party-affiliation constraint. All members must reside in and be registered to vote in New York City.¹¹⁶ The charter also provides contingency provisions if the mayor or speaker fails to make a timely appointment. For example, in a non-election year, if a new member is not appointed within 120 days after a term expires, the sitting member is automatically reappointed for another five-year term.¹¹⁷

113 Local Law 88 of 2017.; New York City Charter §[1053\(a\)\(5\)](#).; Local Law 48 of 2022. New York City Charter §§[1052\(b\)\(1\)](#), [1053\(d\)](#), and [1053\(e\)](#).

114 Local Law 215 of 2019.; New York City Charter §[1057\(g\)\(h\)](#).

115 New York City Charter §[1052\(a\)\(1\)](#).

116 *Id.*

117 *Id.*

Board composition and representation

A core part of the CFB’s vision is that candidates for office are representative of the communities they serve and so too should the Board. However, the Board has often not reflected the diversity of New York City’s residents and has generally not had more than two people of color and/or women serving on the Board.

New York City is one of the most racially, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse cities in the country. According to the latest American Community Survey, in New York City:

- 48% of the population speaks a language other than English at home.
- 37% of the population is foreign-born.
- 67% of households rent their home.
- 17% of the population is 65 years and over.
- 52% of the population is female.¹¹⁸

A board that reflects the diverse demographic characteristics, backgrounds, and experiences of New York City will be best positioned to meet its needs.

Expanding the board as proposed in the second of three recommendations in this chapter would provide opportunities to move towards this vision.

The Board demonstrates a strong commitment to public engagement that extends far beyond its formal oversight responsibilities. Following each citywide election, it holds public hearings that give New Yorkers the opportunity to share their experiences and to provide recommendations for the Board’s consideration. These hearings create a structured forum for voters, candidates, advocates, and community stakeholders to raise a host of democracy-related issues, such as barriers to voting and improvements to the campaign finance system.

118 New York City Department of City Planning. “[Population](#).” 2024.

Recommendations to strengthen CFB governance

In addition to post-election hearings, the Board holds public meetings roughly once a month to review and discuss enforcement issues. Together, these public forums reflect the Board's practice of going beyond formal requirements to ensure that its work is informed by New Yorkers' experiences and that public input meaningfully shapes future reforms.

Most recently, on December 11, 2025, the Board and one of the VAAC's two members at the time, hosted a joint Post-Election Hearing with robust participation from New Yorkers. The CFB invited public testimony focused on New Yorkers' experiences voting in the recent general election and on the city's matching funds program. Advocates, voters, former candidates, and campaign staff submitted 451 written testimonies, and 18 individuals and organizations delivered oral testimonies. Testimonies related to voter experience included feedback and recommendations on accessibility, language access, ballot design, poll sites, and mail-in ballots. Testimonies related to campaign finance and the matching funds program included feedback and recommendations on intermediaries, independent expenditures, program education, public funds allocation, qualifying expenditures, and the auditing process and campaign tools and platforms. Following the public hearing, CFB staff reviewed all testimony, documented topics and policy and program recommendations, and have since engaged in conversations with staff and Board members on how to best address issues and implement policy and program changes.

Current VAAC composition and responsibilities

The VAAC, when fully constituted, consists of nine members: two members appointed by the mayor, two by the speaker of the city council, one by the comptroller, one by the five borough presidents acting together, a chair appointed by the mayor in consultation with the speaker, the public advocate, and the executive director of the New York City Board of Elections (or in the latter two cases, their representatives).¹¹⁹ As with the Board, each member of the VAAC must be a resident of, and registered to vote in, New York City. VAAC members received no monetary compensation and each member serves a term of five years.¹²⁰

The VAAC is charged with advising the Board on strategies to encourage and facilitate voter registration and voting. Its responsibilities include identifying groups or categories of residents who are underrepresented among those registered and those voting, and recommending methods to increase participation among those groups specifically. The VAAC also delivers recommendations to the Board to address disparities in voter participation.

119 New York City Charter § 1054(a). For the two members appointed by the mayor and the speaker, the charter imposes the same political party limitation as for appointments to the Board, in that “not more than one such member shall be enrolled in any one political party.”

120 *Id.*

The VAAC has gone without a Chair since May 2023, and none of the VAAC appointing bodies have made new appointments since the most recent VAAC members' terms officially expired in December 2024. These vacancies and the variety of appointing bodies have rendered the committee effectively dormant since then. While the CFB continued to hold regular public VAAC hearings in 2025, the ability for the VAAC to act on public feedback has been severely limited without leadership or appointed members.

Challenges under the current structure

The VAAC was designed to support critical voter engagement and education efforts, yet it has become non-operational and remains structurally unable to fulfill its mandate. Given the VAAC's resulting inability to perform its intended role, dissolving the body and consolidating it within an existing governance structure would ensure that the VAAC's responsibilities are carried out effectively and with clear accountability.

Fragmented and dispersed appointment authority has contributed to prolonged vacancies and weakened accountability for maintaining a functioning VAAC. The issue is largely structural: while two appointing authorities are responsible for appointing the Board, eight are responsible for appointing VAAC members. There are no mechanisms to enforce these appointing bodies' lack of engagement with the VAAC or appointments to the VAAC. The civic engagement work the VAAC is currently charged with is too important to be ad hoc and disconnected from the Board's mandates.

The VAAC's advisory role also limits its influence, as there are no formal mechanisms to ensure that public input or policy recommendations are incorporated into agency decision-making. As a result, the committee's broad statutory mandate stands in sharp contrast to its limited institutional capacity.

In practice, CFB staff have already assumed responsibility for much of the work the VAAC was designed to advance, including monitoring voter engagement trends, identifying participation gaps, and developing policy recommendations related to registration and turnout. Public feedback on voting and civic participation also regularly occurs during post-election hearings, where members of the public share their concerns and offer recommendations directly to the Board. As the committee itself remains dormant, the VAAC's responsibilities are already embedded in the agency's staff operations and Board processes, even though they are not formally integrated into its charter mandate.

The goal of the three recommendations outlined below is to re-envision a consolidated Board that is more effective, and delivers better services, more efficiently, to New Yorkers.

Recommendation 1: Integrate VAAC responsibilities into the Board

Integrating VAAC responsibilities into the Board would centralize governance and formalize voter engagement as a core Board responsibility, building on the considerable public engagement work the Board already undertakes. In practice, agency staff already carry out the substantive work associated with the VAAC, and legislative changes over time have built on the CFB's record of success as a leader in local democracy and civic engagement work. This proposal would align the formal governance structure with operational reality by placing the VAAC's responsibilities directly with the Board rather than maintaining an indirect advisory body.

Under this integrated framework, the Board would take on VAAC's charter mandates, including recommending strategies to increase voter registration and voter turnout. The Board would identify communities that are underrepresented among registered voters and develop targeted recommendations to improve registration and turnout within those populations. It would receive and review complaints regarding those processes, and make recommendations to the mayor, the city council, the borough presidents, the New York City Board of Elections, and relevant city agencies regarding steps to strengthen voter engagement citywide.

To formalize the feedback loop between the Board and the public, the new Board should be required to hold two public hearings each year, one following the publication of the annual Voter Analysis Report, and the other following the general election. This structure would ensure regular, transparent engagement while consolidating accountability within a single governing body; it also mimics the current VAAC hearing requirements.

Recommendation 2: Expand Board to seven members

A larger Board would provide an opportunity for a wide diversity of perspectives and expertise that best reflects New York City.

Adding two new members would allow the appointment structure to remain balanced and maintain two appointing bodies, rather than adding additional complexity. Under this approach, the mayor and speaker would each appoint three members (increased from two) and the chairperson would continue to be appointed by the mayor after consultation with the speaker. Consistent with the charter requirements today that limit the total number of Board members from the same political party, the charter should also be revised to limit the mayor's and speaker's regular appointees to no more than two from the same political party. As under the current structure, the chairperson is not subject to this political party affiliation constraint.

Consolidating the VAAC's responsibilities would also make the Board's composition even more consequential, as it would become the sole governing body directly accountable for both administering the campaign finance system and advancing voter participation citywide. New York City is one of the most racially, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse cities in the country; the institution charged with safeguarding local democracy could meaningfully reflect that diversity. A more diverse Board would help achieve the agency's guiding mission: that when every New Yorker is empowered to participate meaningfully in elections, candidates for office will be reflective of the communities they serve, elected leaders will be accountable to the public, and New Yorkers will have a democracy they can trust.

Recent appointments have already helped the Board to become more representative of the city it serves. Expanding the Board by adding two new members would provide opportunities to further this progress.

Recommendation 3: Align compensation with peer boards

Board members are paid \$100 per day of work—an amount set in 1988 and never updated—and VAAC members are unpaid. Adjusting the per diem structure would potentially help attract Board appointments from a greater range of lived experiences and economic backgrounds. Without adjusting compensation, Board service may remain limited to individuals who can afford to assume substantial responsibilities for comparatively low pay relative to peer city boards and commissions.

Any compensation adjustment should be informed by benchmarking against comparable city boards and commissions to ensure equity and fiscal responsibility.¹²¹ The CFB should consider adopting a framework similar to that of the New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB), an independent agency tasked with government ethics regulation and enforcement. COIB links minimum compensation to the highest-paid member of any city board or commission. Given the Board's independent regulatory role of the matching funds program, a comparable provision would recognize the significance and complexity of its mandate while reinforcing transparency and integrity.

121 For this recommendation, an internal review was conducted that analyzed how peer boards and commissions contemplated compensation, borough representation, and subject matter experience; peer entities include the Conflicts of Interest Board, the Board of Correction, the Civil Service Commission, the Civic Engagement Commission, and the Rent Guidelines Board.

Pathway to a strengthened and consolidated Board

Strengthening the CFB's governance aligns with broader democracy and good government priorities: increasing public trust, centering voter experience, and ensuring that oversight bodies reflect the communities they serve. Consolidating advisory and oversight functions, expanding Board capacity, and updating compensation would position the CFB to meet contemporary challenges in campaign finance regulation and voter engagement alike in one unified body.

City government works best when decision makers can hear directly from New Yorkers. This proposal would allow New York voters, particularly those most underrepresented in voting, to take an active and sustainable role in shaping democracy reforms that are advanced by the CFB. This moment presents a clear opportunity to advance reforms that reinforce New York City's role as a national leader in democratic governance—by ensuring that the institutions tasked with protecting democracy are robust, representative, and accountable.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The 2025 election cycle demonstrated that New York City's local democracy is healthy and capable of engaging voters at levels more commonly associated with federal elections. The matching funds program worked as intended. Voter turnout and registration hit historic highs. New voters participated at record levels.

This moment presents a clear opportunity to advance reforms that reinforce New York City's role as a national leader in democratic governance.

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix A: Voter registration by community district, 2021 and 2025

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|--|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 1 & 2 (Melrose-Mott Haven-Port Morris-Longwood-Hunts Point)* | 84.5% | 98.3% | 13.8 |
| Bronx CD 3 & 6 (Morrisania-Crotona Park East-Tremont-Belmont-West Farms)* | 83.6% | 83.9% | 0.3 |
| Bronx CD 4 (Highbridge-Concourse)* | 90.5% | 100.0% | 9.5 |
| Bronx CD 5 (Morris Heights-Mount Hope)* | 95.4% | 90.9% | -4.5 |
| Bronx CD 7 (Fordham-Bedford Park-Norwood)* | 96.7% | 99.8% | 3.1 |
| Bronx CD 8 (Riverdale-Kingsbridge-Marble Hill) | 80.5% | 97.1% | 16.5 |
| Bronx CD 9 (Soundview-Parkchester) | 88.9% | 100.0% | 11.1 |
| Bronx CD 10 (Co-op City-Throgs Neck) | 85.9% | 88.3% | 2.4 |

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|---|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 11 (Pelham Parkway-Morris Park) | 71.3% | 85.8% | 14.5 |
| Bronx CD 12 (Wakefield-Williamsbridge- Eastchester) | 99.8% | 83.5% | -16.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 1 (Williamsburg-Greenpoint) | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 2 (Downtown Brooklyn-Fort Greene) | 79.2% | 100.0% | 20.8 |
| Brooklyn CD 3 (Bedford-Stuyvesant) | 100.0% | 91.5% | -8.5 |
| Brooklyn CD 4 (Bushwick) | 84.8% | 100.0% | 15.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 5 (East New York-Cypress Hills)* | 100.0% | 91.7% | -8.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 6 (Park Slope-Carroll Gardens) | 97.5% | 93.2% | -4.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 7 (Sunset Park-Windsor Terrace)* | 92.3% | 100.0% | 7.7 |
| Brooklyn CD 8 (Crown Heights) | 70.7% | 89.0% | 18.3 |

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|--|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Brooklyn CD 9 (Crown Heights) | 87.0% | 100.0% | 13.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 10 (Bay Ridge-Dyker Heights) | 93.0% | 92.1% | -0.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 11 (Bensonhurst-Bath Beach)* | 72.6% | 84.9% | 12.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 12 (Borough Park-Kensington) | 98.6% | 94.4% | -4.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 13 (Coney Island-Brighton Beach)* | 75.2% | 85.6% | 10.5 |
| Brooklyn CD 14 (Flatbush-Midwood) | 87.7% | 100.0% | 12.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 15 (Sheepshead Bay-Gravesend)* | 83.4% | 95.3% | 12.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 16 (Ocean Hill-Brownsville) | 63.9% | 78.9% | 15.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 17 (East Flatbush) | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 18 (Canarsie-Flatlands)* | 94.0% | 100.0% | 6.0 |

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|---|-------------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Manhattan CD 1 & 2 (Financial District-Tribeca-Greenwich Village-SoHo) | 87.5% | 90.9% | 3.4 |
| Manhattan CD 3 (Lower East Side-Chinatown) | 90.9% | 89.3% | -1.6 |
| Manhattan CD 4 (Chelsea-Hell's Kitchen)** | — | — | — |
| Manhattan CD 5 (Midtown-Flatiron-Union Square)** | — | — | — |
| Manhattan CD 6 (East Midtown-Murray Hill)** | — | — | — |
| Manhattan CD 7 (Upper West Side) | 100.0% | 95.7% | -4.3 |
| Manhattan CD 8 (Upper East Side-Roosevelt Island) | 94.8% | 95.9% | 1.1 |
| Manhattan CD 9 (Morningside Heights-Hamilton Heights) | 75.9% | 85.1% | 9.3 |
| Manhattan CD 10 (Harlem) | 96.8% | 98.7% | 1.9 |
| Manhattan CD 11 (East Harlem) | 91.5% | 90.4% | -1.0 |

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|--|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Manhattan CD 12 (Washington Heights-Inwood) | 86.5% | 100.0% | 13.5 |
| Queens CD 1 (Astoria-Queensbridge) | 98.2% | 95.9% | -2.2 |
| Queens CD 2 (Long Island City-Sunnyside-Woodside) | 87.2% | 99.4% | 12.2 |
| Queens CD 3 (Jackson Heights-East Elmhurst)* | 99.9% | 97.6% | -2.3 |
| Queens CD 4 (Elmhurst-Corona)* | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0 |
| Queens CD 5 (Ridgewood-Maspeth-Middle Village) | 84.3% | 88.7% | 4.5 |
| Queens CD 6 (Forest Hills-Rego Park) | 82.7% | 91.6% | 8.9 |
| Queens CD 7 (Flushing-Murray Hill-Whitestone)* | 81.3% | 87.1% | 5.7 |
| Queens CD 8 (Fresh Meadows-Hillcrest-Briarwood) | 85.1% | 94.2% | 9.1 |
| Queens CD 9 (Kew Gardens-Richmond Hill-Woodhaven) | 85.5% | 95.3% | 9.9 |

| Community District | Registration rate | | |
|---|-------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Queens CD 10 (South Ozone Park-Howard Beach) | 66.5% | 85.6% | 19.1 |
| Queens CD 11 (Auburndale-Bayside-Douglaston) | 88.2% | 91.9% | 3.7 |
| Queens CD 12 (Jamaica-St. Albans-Hollis) | 85.7% | 94.2% | 8.5 |
| Queens CD 13 (Queens Village-Bellerose-Rosedale) | 87.6% | 96.2% | 8.6 |
| Queens CD 14 (The Rockaways) | 79.5% | 81.9% | 2.4 |
| Staten Island CD 1 (North Shore) | 89.9% | 91.3% | 1.4 |
| Staten Island CD 2 (Mid-Island) | 94.1% | 91.8% | -2.3 |
| Staten Island CD 3 (South Shore) | 89.9% | 100.0% | 10.1 |

* Denotes a CFB priority community district.

** The 2021 PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) combine Manhattan Community Districts 4 and 5 in the Citizens of Voting Age estimates. Following New York City's 2022 redistricting, the 2024 PUMAs combine Manhattan Community Districts 5 and 6 instead. Because these geographic units do not align across years, they are excluded from the analysis, as turnout differences between 2021 and 2025 cannot be reliably compared.

Appendix B: Voter turnout by community district, primary election, 2021 and 2025

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 1 (Melrose-Mott Haven-Port Morris)* | 14.0% | 15.8% | 1.8 |
| Bronx CD 2 (Longwood-Hunts Point)* | 14.6% | 16.4% | 1.8 |
| Bronx CD 3 (Morrisania-Crotona Park East)* | 15.0% | 15.2% | 0.2 |
| Bronx CD 4 (Highbridge-Concourse)* | 17.7% | 18.2% | 0.5 |
| Bronx CD 5 (Morris Heights-Mount Hope)* | 15.9% | 16.4% | 0.5 |
| Bronx CD 6 (Tremont-Belmont-West Farms)* | 14.1% | 15.0% | 0.9 |
| Bronx CD 7 (Fordham-Bedford Park-Norwood)* | 16.9% | 19.6% | 2.7 |
| Bronx CD 8 (Riverdale-Kingsbridge-Marble Hill) | 30.7% | 34.6% | 3.9 |
| Bronx CD 9 (Soundview-Parkchester) | 19.6% | 20.1% | 0.5 |
| Bronx CD 10 (Co-op City-Throgs Neck) | 24.4% | 25.3% | 0.9 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 11 (Pelham Parkway-Morris Park) | 18.6% | 21.4% | 2.8 |
| Bronx CD 12 (Wakefield-Williamsbridge- Eastchester) | 20.7% | 21.9% | 1.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 1 (Williamsburg-Greenpoint) | 27.9% | 39.5% | 11.6 |
| Brooklyn CD 2 (Downtown Brooklyn-Fort Greene) | 40.3% | 50.2% | 9.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 3 (Bedford-Stuyvesant) | 28.0% | 37.0% | 9.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 4 (Bushwick) | 21.0% | 36.7% | 15.7 |
| Brooklyn CD 5 (East New York-Cypress Hills)* | 19.0% | 17.8% | -1.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 6 (Park Slope-Carroll Gardens) | 44.3% | 55.6% | 11.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 7 (Sunset Park-Windsor Terrace)* | 32.3% | 39.4% | 7.1 |
| Brooklyn CD 8 (Crown Heights) | 35.4% | 44.2% | 8.8 |
| Brooklyn CD 9 (Crown Heights) | 32.2% | 35.8% | 3.6 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Brooklyn CD 10 (Bay Ridge-Dyker Heights) | 25.8% | 29.7% | 3.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 11 (Bensonhurst-Bath Beach)* | 18.4% | 19.2% | 0.8 |
| Brooklyn CD 12 (Borough Park-Kensington) | 27.9% | 32.2% | 4.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 13 (Coney Island-Brighton Beach)* | 18.2% | 20.8% | 2.6 |
| Brooklyn CD 14 (Flatbush-Midwood) | 29.0% | 36.2% | 7.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 15 (Sheepshead Bay-Gravesend)* | 19.7% | 23.6% | 3.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 16 (Ocean Hill-Brownsville) | 20.8% | 20.6% | -0.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 17 (East Flatbush) | 26.0% | 25.8% | -0.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 18 (Canarsie-Flatlands)* | 25.3% | 24.4% | -0.9 |
| Manhattan CD 1 (Financial District-Tribeca) | 30.9% | 41.1% | 10.2 |
| Manhattan CD 2 (Greenwich Village-SoHo) | 37.6% | 46.7% | 9.1 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Manhattan CD 3 (Lower East Side-Chinatown) | 28.2% | 36.7% | 8.5 |
| Manhattan CD 4 (Chelsea-Hell's Kitchen) | 34.3% | 42.8% | 8.5 |
| Manhattan CD 5 (Midtown-Flatiron-Union Square) | 28.6% | 38.1% | 9.5 |
| Manhattan CD (East Midtown-Murray Hill) | 35.0% | 45.8% | 10.8 |
| Manhattan CD 7 (Upper West Side) | 41.6% | 51.2% | 9.6 |
| Manhattan CD 8 (Upper East Side-Roosevelt Island) | 36.9% | 47.5% | 10.6 |
| Manhattan CD 9 (Morningside Heights-Hamilton Heights) | 27.6% | 34.9% | 7.3 |
| Manhattan CD 10 (Harlem) | 28.5% | 32.4% | 3.9 |
| Manhattan CD 11 (East Harlem) | 21.4% | 28.2% | 6.8 |
| Manhattan CD 12 (Washington Heights-Inwood) | 24.7% | 31.0% | 6.3 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Queens CD 1 (Astoria-Queensbridge) | 27.2% | 37.4% | 10.2 |
| Queens CD 2 (Long Island City-Sunnyside-Woodside) | 30.5% | 36.8% | 6.3 |
| Queens CD 3 (Jackson Heights-East Elmhurst)* | 24.6% | 28.6% | 4.0 |
| Queens CD 4 (Elmhurst-Corona)* | 21.8% | 21.2% | -0.6 |
| Queens CD 5 (Ridgewood-Maspeth-Middle Village) | 21.6% | 26.1% | 4.5 |
| Queens CD 6 (Forest Hills-Rego Park) | 30.8% | 32.5% | 1.7 |
| Queens CD 7 (Flushing-Murray Hill-Whitestone)* | 25.6% | 18.9% | -6.7 |
| Queens CD 8 (Fresh Meadows-Hillcrest-Briarwood) | 25.7% | 27.3% | 1.6 |
| Queens CD 9 (Kew Gardens-Richmond Hill-Woodhaven) | 19.4% | 21.0% | 1.6 |
| Queens CD 10 (South Ozone Park-Howard Beach) | 17.9% | 17.2% | -0.7 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Queens CD 11 (Auburndale-Bayside-Douglaston) | 28.2% | 23.7% | -4.5 |
| Queens CD 12 (Jamaica-St. Albans-Hollis) | 23.6% | 22.6% | -1.1 |
| Queens CD 13 (Queens Village-Bellerose-Rosedale) | 27.1% | 24.3% | -2.8 |
| Queens CD 14 (The Rockaways) | 24.6% | 22.8% | -1.8 |
| Staten Island CD 1 (North Shore) | 24.6% | 19.7% | -4.9 |
| Staten Island CD 2 (Mid-Island) | 22.8% | 15.6% | -7.2 |
| Staten Island CD 3 (South Shore) | 20.0% | 13.3% | -6.7 |

* Denotes a CFB priority community district.

Appendix C: Voter turnout by community district, general election, 2021 and 2025

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 1 (Melrose-Mott Haven-Port Morris)* | 12.8% | 23.9% | 11.1 |
| Bronx CD 2 (Longwood-Hunts Point)* | 13.2% | 24.0% | 10.8 |
| Bronx CD 3 (Morrisania-Crotona Park East)* | 13.4% | 23.5% | 10.1 |
| Bronx CD 4 (Highbridge-Concourse)* | 15.6% | 26.7% | 11.1 |
| Bronx CD 5 (Morris Heights-Mount Hope)* | 13.4% | 23.9% | 10.5 |
| Bronx CD 6 (Tremont-Belmont-West Farms)* | 12.2% | 23.2% | 11.0 |
| Bronx CD 7 (Fordham-Bedford Park-Norwood)* | 14.2% | 28.1% | 13.9 |
| Bronx CD 8 (Riverdale-Kingsbridge-Marble Hill) | 26.8% | 44.4% | 17.6 |
| Bronx CD 9 (Soundview-Parkchester) | 16.9% | 30.3% | 13.4 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Bronx CD 10 (Co-op City-Throgs Neck) | 26.7% | 41.3% | 14.6 |
| Bronx CD 11 (Pelham Parkway-Morris Park) | 18.3% | 34.5% | 16.2 |
| Bronx CD 12 (Wakefield-Williamsbridge- Eastchester) | 19.1% | 30.0% | 10.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 1 (Williamsburg-Greenpoint) | 17.3% | 44.5% | 27.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 2 (Downtown Brooklyn-Fort Greene) | 28.8% | 53.6% | 24.8 |
| Brooklyn CD 3 (Bedford-Stuyvesant) | 20.1% | 41.7% | 21.6 |
| Brooklyn CD 4 (Bushwick) | 14.5% | 41.0% | 26.5 |
| Brooklyn CD 5 (East New York-Cypress Hills)* | 15.9% | 26.8% | 10.9 |
| Brooklyn CD 6 (Park Slope-Carroll Gardens) | 33.3% | 57.3% | 24.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 7 (Sunset Park-Windsor Terrace)* | 23.7% | 43.3% | 19.6 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Brooklyn CD 8 (Crown Heights) | 25.8% | 47.5% | 21.7 |
| Brooklyn CD 9 (Crown Heights) | 23.8% | 44.1% | 20.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 10 (Bay Ridge-Dyker Heights) | 30.8% | 46.8% | 16.0 |
| Brooklyn CD 11 (Bensonhurst-Bath Beach)* | 19.0% | 37.3% | 18.3 |
| Brooklyn CD 12 (Borough Park-Kensington) | 21.2% | 51.6% | 30.4 |
| Brooklyn CD 13 (Coney Island-Brighton Beach)* | 21.2% | 38.7% | 17.5 |
| Brooklyn CD 14 (Flatbush-Midwood) | 23.6% | 45.3% | 21.7 |
| Brooklyn CD 15 (Sheepshead Bay-Gravesend)* | 23.8% | 47.0% | 23.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 16 (Ocean Hill-Brownsville) | 17.6% | 27.8% | 10.2 |
| Brooklyn CD 17 (East Flatbush) | 21.7% | 33.8% | 12.1 |
| Brooklyn CD 18 (Canarsie-Flatlands)* | 24.7% | 39.1% | 14.4 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Manhattan CD 1 (Financial District-Tribeca) | 22.5% | 50.6% | 28.1 |
| Manhattan CD 2 (Greenwich Village-SoHo) | 28.2% | 54.0% | 25.8 |
| Manhattan CD 3 (Lower East Side-Chinatown) | 22.2% | 42.0% | 19.8 |
| Manhattan CD 4 (Chelsea-Hell's Kitchen) | 26.5% | 50.2% | 23.7 |
| Manhattan CD 5 (Midtown-Flatiron-Union Square) | 21.4% | 47.2% | 25.8 |
| Manhattan CD 6 (East Midtown-Murray Hill) | 30.0% | 55.4% | 25.4 |
| Manhattan CD 7 (Upper West Side) | 34.0% | 57.5% | 23.5 |
| Manhattan CD 8 (Upper East Side-Roosevelt Island) | 31.4% | 59.2% | 27.8 |
| Manhattan CD 9 (Morningside Heights- Hamilton Heights) | 22.9% | 41.1% | 18.2 |
| Manhattan CD 10 (Harlem) | 25.0% | 39.9% | 14.9 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|---|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Manhattan CD 11 (East Harlem) | 19.4% | 34.9% | 15.5 |
| Manhattan CD 12 (Washington Heights-Inwood) | 20.8% | 37.7% | 16.9 |
| Queens CD 1 (Astoria-Queensbridge) | 23.2% | 46.6% | 23.4 |
| Queens CD 2 (Long Island City-Sunnyside-Woodside) | 23.5% | 47.0% | 23.5 |
| Queens CD 3 (Jackson Heights-East Elmhurst)* | 20.7% | 39.0% | 18.3 |
| Queens CD 4 (Elmhurst-Corona)* | 15.7% | 32.7% | 17.0 |
| Queens CD 5 (Ridgewood-Maspeth-Middle Village) | 24.7% | 44.2% | 19.5 |
| Queens CD 6 (Forest Hills-Rego Park) | 27.2% | 50.0% | 22.8 |
| Queens CD 7 (Flushing-Murray Hill-Whitestone)* | 24.2% | 37.5% | 13.3 |
| Queens CD 8 (Fresh Meadows-Hillcrest-Briarwood) | 22.4% | 43.8% | 21.4 |

| Community District | Turnout rate | | |
|--|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | 2021 | 2025 | Percentage point difference |
| Queens CD 9 (Kew Gardens-Richmond Hill-Woodhaven) | 17.4% | 35.3% | 17.9 |
| Queens CD 10 (South Ozone Park-Howard Beach) | 20.8% | 35.3% | 14.5 |
| Queens CD 11 (Auburndale-Bayside-Douglaston) | 28.5% | 44.7% | 16.2 |
| Queens CD 12 (Jamaica-St. Albans-Hollis) | 20.3% | 32.5% | 12.2 |
| Queens CD 13 (Queens Village-Bellerose-Rosedale) | 24.0% | 37.7% | 13.7 |
| Queens CD 14 (The Rockaways) | 28.7% | 40.8% | 12.1 |
| Staten Island CD 1 (North Shore) | 29.5% | 40.6% | 11.1 |
| Staten Island CD 2 (Mid-Island) | 31.9% | 45.3% | 13.4 |
| Staten Island CD 3 (South Shore) | 39.1% | 50.5% | 11.4 |

* Denotes a CFB priority community district.

